In another thread,
@makesends,
@ElectedbyHim and myself started to get into a discussion about free will and it was suggested we open another thread. So here is a thread.
I will start by saying in my view, free will is the ability to choose between two or more options. IE, ADAM had to chose between following God or following his wife. And chose to follow his wife.
Abraham had to chose between believing God and doing what God asked him to do. Or not believing God and staying where he was at his fathers house.
I look forward to other views and what they think free will means. I believe strongly it is essential to understand a persons view to be able to understand what they are saying. I am sure not everyone sees it as i do. So if I interpret what they say as per my defenition. I will not be able to understand what they are saying, and the discussion will go downhill fast.
My Approach
I've read about a page or two of the 22. So obviously, I have no idea how the thread has progressed. Instead, I'm just going to address the opening post, as if it were posted a few minutes ago.
Paragraph Two
The opening post is arranged into, roughly, four paragraphs. I'll be making a few observations about your second paragraph. A critical portion of this paragraph is a statement about free will. "
free will is the ability to choose between two or more options." Unfortunately, this is a poor definition. The
libertarian free will advocate would be ok with this, and the
compatibilist view of choice-making would also be ok with this.
The main difference between the two different views, just mentioned, is a causal reason for the choice. For the
libertarian free will advocate, there is no causal reason why the choice was thus and not otherwise, since they have to maintain an ability to do either of the options. Thusly, if something causes the will to be thus, and not otherwise, then only one option was possible, in thier view.
The
compatibilist view of choice is obviously different. This view holds that a choice takes place because of causal reasons within the person (as such, the ability to do otherwise is denied. However, there are different views of compatibilism, and some do hold to this view. I do not hold to the ability to do otherwise.) A person considers the various futuer objections of choice (i.e. options), and the person considers (deliberation) the various pros and cons of each future object of choice. Eventually, the mind arrives at one option, which is preferred. The preponderance of consideration goes to one in particular, and thusly, the person chooses as he/she most prefers. As Jonathan Edwards said . . . to choose is to prefer.
Hence, I see a significant conflation the libertarian free will advocate makes. Yes, a person does consider two or more future objects of choice; however,
one ought not conflate these options with the equal ability to choose either. This is where the lib definition makes a fatal error. Options are future objects of choice present to the mind. The ability to do otherwise, is the ability to make an undetermined/uncaused choice. Way too often, the two are conflated when they should be separated.
Paragraph Three
Yes, Abraham made a choice, but the kind of choice is important to clarify. All are agreed that Abraham made a choice, so that point is moot.
Paragraph Four
I agree that seeing other people's definitions is crucial. This discussion topic is loaded with mountains of equivocation. People often talk past one another precisely because they have different views of choice-making and what constitutes human freedom. I'm fine with a person being able to do has he/she most prefers. I'm absolutely opposed to any form of libertarian freedom. If you would like to see a small critique I did of libertarian freedom, then you can check out the following link.
This post is meant as a critique of the pagan idol, libertarian freedom. In many conversations between Calvinists and Arminians this issue comes up. The non-technical wording for libertarian freedom is "free will." Libertarian freedom entails two essential elements: (1) The ability to do/chose otherwise, (2) some form of human ontological ultimacy (either the will or the agent is ultimate). The second point speaks toward the assumption of the undetermined nature of the agent or the will. The first point speaks toward the idea that the person could potentially have chosen in a way...