Then let's resolve this. The statement in question was 1),
If what was posted was understood (as is now claimed) then why ask its meaning?
But, more importantly, that's not the only place where a contradiction exists. The contradiction exists when affirming causality as an attribute of volition and then questioning its meaning AND asserting the position, "there's no implication that just because it does cause, and is itself a 'second cause', and is, itself, unlike most other causes, a willed cause, that it is not also an effect of many other causes, and that, in EVERY particular."
It does not matter that your understanding was later provided (when it wasn't). At that point the posts contradicted themselves.
Here's why the error exists: it does not matter how many predicate causes exist..... the human will is always able to transcend them all, except two (God and sin depraving condition). In other words, human volition always has the capacity to act in antithesis of any or all predicates. It is, potentially, an isolated second cause. The will's only ordinarily inescapable predicate is its having been created by God. Salvifically, the predicate condition of sin is prohibitive but who had beans for breakfast, whether it's raining, the car will start, or the cat turned pink is (or can be) completely immaterial.
Post 52 contradicts itself. There are at least two other logical fallacies employed therein but the rules stipulate the most serious be addressed first.
You say, above, "The statement in question was 1),". You don't show what that statement was. I'm not sure what you are referring to. I will quote #52 here:
I believe the salient point @ReverendRV is emphasizing is that the creature's will (or creatures' wills) is a secondary cause, or among the many secondary causes established by God (all of which may have liberty or contingency). (Rev, correct me if I erred)
I agree, which I attempted to deal with next:
Having said all that, I do agree that God has (rather obviously) established second causes, though "liberty" is not a word I would incorporate into that thought.
Is human volition a secondary cause? Or, worded differently, does human volition contain any causality? Is causality an attribute of human volition?
Of course it is! Human volition sits smack dab between antecedent causes and its own effects. "Is causality an attribute of human volition?" Lol, what does that even mean? Attribute? Could you not similarly ask if causality is not an attribute of just about any effect-become-cause? Human volition, as I just finished saying, is both effect and cause. Why didn't you simply ask if human volition causes things? Because it's too obvious that it does?
But there's no implication that just because it does cause, and is itself a 'second cause', and is, itself, unlike most other causes, a willed cause, that it is not also an effect of many other causes, and that, in EVERY particular
Or was 1) from some other post?
Anyhow, if I get you right, you affirm that it was your axiom that demonstrates my self-contradiction, and not so much the above question. So I will work off of that:
If what was posted was understood (as is now claimed) then why ask its meaning?
As I remember, I asked the meaning of only part of it-- the term, "attribute". I understood what 'attribute' means to me, which is why I brought it up, since it didn't fit there for human causality anymore than it fits for any other causality (but God's).
But, more importantly, that's not the only place where a contradiction exists. The contradiction exists when affirming causality as an attribute of volition and then questioning its meaning AND asserting the position, "there's no implication that just because it does cause, and is itself a 'second cause', and is, itself, unlike most other causes, a willed cause, that it is not also an effect of many other causes, and that, in EVERY particular."
Now here you finally explain yourself. I affirmed causality as an attribute of volition only in the one respect--if causality also was an attribute of any other effect-become-cause. Otherwise, the term, "attribute" did not fit (in my mind).
But you insist that it does, as though, unlike other causes, mankind is endowed with the ability to shed off ALL influences but God and a "sin depraving condition". I disagree rather vehemently. Human volition is NOT able to act in antithesis to all predicates. Any that it is aware of and chooses to act in defiance of or to ignore it (or that it is not aware of and accidently acts in antithesis to), by negation is acting in response to (or not by conscious will does the same). Thus, no. But, if. at the best, you can say that
any predicates can be acted in antithesis to, you still can not say that
all of them can be acted in antithesis to in any one decision. And, again, as I said, if one is acting in antithesis to something, it is acting BECAUSE OF that thing, though against it. Thus, still influenced, and if influenced, caused.
It does not matter that your understanding was later provided (when it wasn't). At that point the posts contradicted themselves.
The fact you did not understand what I said below that, as sufficiently describing my understanding, does not render it undescribed. But it seems that is unrelated to your previous assertion of my self-contradiction. I will refrain from describing it as quite off-topic.
Here's why the error exists: it does not matter how many predicate causes exist..... the human will is always able to transcend them all, except two (God and sin depraving condition). In other words, human volition always has the capacity to act in antithesis of any or all predicates. It is, potentially, an isolated second cause. The will's only ordinarily inescapable predicate is its having been created by God. Salvifically, the predicate condition of sin is prohibitive but who had beans for breakfast, whether it's raining, the car will start, or the cat turned pink is (or can be) completely immaterial.
At times you seem to get it, at other times, most definitely not, that there are perhaps millions or more causes (influences) that feed into any decision anyone (but God) makes, and that, at all sorts of levels of influence. Whether you reject some, ignore some, act in defiance to or in ignorance of or by shrugging off some or by otherwise making up your mind, or by a sudden off-the-wall choice, it was caused. The will is not uncaused, nor can it behave uncaused to behave as it is caused. It is only endemic to the person.
Now if you can show me how, logically, there is something that man does that God did not cause to happen, through means, (not at all saying that God can't cause one to do something that is not a result of any or all erstwhile causes), but that upholds your case that man can act in antithesis of all predicates, please do so.
Post 52 contradicts itself. There are at least two other logical fallacies employed therein but the rules stipulate the most serious be addressed first.
Yep, the two other ones need to wait.
