Responding to Open Theism (pt2b)
Basic Critique Summary
Several critical areas come to mind when perusing Boyd's opening main point. (1) The hinge of his argument swings upon libertarian freedom, which I reject for various reasons. (2) On account of libertarian freedom, the evidence of scripture could never possibly be "exhaustive;" for his view of freedom disallows the possibility. (3) Because of the previous, Boyd fails to discern the true default position. (4) His argument is a caricature of the exhaustive sovereignty/knowledge position; for he does not represent actual arguments many have made in that regard. (5) His exegesis is significantly faulty. (6) In particular, his comments regarding Acts 4 cause great concern.
Having briefly summarized my thoughts on the matter, please consider each point as they are explained in more detail.
The Viability of Libertarian Freedom
Quite a few writers have pointed out the problems inherent within libertarian free will. It fails the test of coherence, for it fails the law of identity/contradiction. It posits an ultimate cause either with the agent or the will itself, which violates multiple scripture passages that point out that man or his will is simply not an ultimate. God sustains His creation, and He gives man life. There is no such thing as a human that is autonomous from God. Libertarian freedom violates the scriptural principle that the heart governs the will/choice-making faculty of a person.
However, Boyd makes a few comments with respect to a person's nature. These comments are rather revealing. Boyd states, "
My act of deliberation presupposes that it lies within my power either to purchase this book or to not." (p. 18) This is simply a non-sequitur. One's act of deliberation demonstrates the objects of choice present to the mind. It does not mean that one can choose any of the objects present to the mind, for that would suppose that a person could both be himself and not himself in the events preceding the choice or with respect to the choice itself. Such a presupposition would be the very definition of a contradiction and a violation of the law of identity previously mentioned. The reality is that a person considers the merits and demerits of the objects of choice and then chooses in light of which object seems most preferable. A choice is an act of preference. Boyd simply does not demonstrate an adequate understanding of the choice-making process with his comment. Rather, he is only demonstrating a preference for libertarian freedom while ignoring other more-coherent choice-making models.
If one supposes that there was no cause for a choice (and therefore it could have been otherwise), then we land squarely upon a chance determination of the will. And now this causeless choice is not something that is responsible behavior. Rather, it becomes chaotic, chance, and anything but responsible. It is what we would assume of the mentally insane. It would destroy responsibility rather than helping establish responsibility.
In the next paragraph Boyd qualifies his earlier comment. I'll quote the next paragraph in its entirety.
"
In other words, to deliberate about any particular matter, we must be freed from deliberating about every matter. Our sense of freedom presupposes that much of the future is already settled. Our freedom must always take place within the parameters of things we do not choose. We have no choice but to live as though some things are up to us to resolve and some things are not. In short, we live as though the future is partly settled and partly open. The openness view of the future simply roots this 'as though' in reality and renders it intelligible." (p. 18)
First, we can see that Boyd is just simply restating his main point. He is stating that the future is both open and closed (see part 2a, post #39). I guess that we can grant him the fact that teachers use redundancy to drive home a point, but outside of teaching his comments here seem rather redundant.
Second, he is seeking to narrow the field in which deliberation is made. This sort of helps him negate some elements of the chance objection, since he is disallowing that any possible choice could be made. Rather, only choices within a certain domain or sphere are allowed.
Third, even with the qualifications made, the openness view is not rendered intelligible, contrary to what Boyd states. His view of the will and choice-making still sits upon the dilemma of either being a chance event or unable to dodge the necessary implications of the law of identity.
Fourth, rather than stating that "
Our freedom must always take place within the parameters of things we do not choose." He could simply have stated that the future objects of choice (commonly referred to as
options) are limited. In short, we never consider all things in reality as choice-worthy. Rather, a choice is in keeping with the environment. Should I open the door to the establishment I want to enter? Should I order my usual or not? Should I pay cash or card? Etc. Boyd's comment is a bit on the
no duh side of stating the extremely obvious.
Next, Boyd appeals to science and "
quantum particles" (p. 18) as a support for his view of the will and the future being both open and closed.
First, it is debatable whether or not quantum indeterminacy exists or not. Two physicists in a book I read present their formula for correcting Heisenberg's uncertainty principle into a deterministic view.
Second, the fact that a particle comes from an unknown is a statement of the ignorance of the scientist and not evidence of a statement of reality (argument from silence).
Third, science deals with the natural realm because of an inherited standard called methodological naturalism. Therefore, it is a
category error to appeal to a situation in natural causation (material realm) to deal with a choice brought about in the immaterial realm of a person.
Later, Boyd speaks of "
self-determining agents." (p. 20) In the context of the discussion, Boyd's meaning is that he is ascribing to them ultimate causality. But this assumption fails because scripture explicitly denies such a causal ability to human beings. (See Acts 17, Col 1, Heb 1:3, Romans 11 last verse, etc.) Further, the wording of self-determination can be used to deny libertarian freedom by asking what, of the self, determines the will. Calvinists can point out that if the self truly does determine the will, then it could not have been otherwise.
Also on page 20, Boyd speaks of Peter's character and how Jesus could predict Peter's future action on the basis of his character. But now we have to ask how certain this prediction was (granting the false assumption of predictive knowledge). Was the choice necessarily true and thus could not have been otherwise? Was Peter's character so clear and determinative that Peter's choice could not have been otherwise? If Peter's character was not determinative, then how could Jesus have made such a perfect prediction on the basis of a chance event?
In summary, Boyd's metaphysical assumption of libertarian freedom is garbage. It fails coherency in every instance of its application, and thusly his use of libertarian freedom is simply unwarranted. I think that much better models of understanding human choice-making are more coherent and in better keeping with scripture. Hence, I completely reject Boyd's most important and determinative assumption: libertarian freedom.
