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One of the oldest tricks in debate is to hide a controversial claim within a seemingly innocent question, and one of the sharpest skills a Christian apologist can possess is being able to detect those hidden premises and draw them out into the light. "Have you stopped beating your wife?" is the classic example used in the philosophy classroom. The question smuggles in a suggestion of guilt that the respondent inadvertently concedes if he answers the question as framed with either yes or no. Sneaky, right? The only way out is to challenge the question itself and expose the hidden premise.
I recently encountered a similar kind of question that targeted Christians. At first glance, it sounds fair-minded. But in reality it carries a hidden premise which no Christian should grant—that neutrality is both possible and necessary for religious truth. By answering the question as framed, you end up conceding its most controversial premise.
1. "How can you be sure your religion is the correct one if you have not weighed other religions neutrally against Christianity?"
This is a case of the Complex Question fallacy. The question smuggles in a hidden premise, namely, that one can weigh religions "neutrally." But that is precisely the point at issue. If Christianity is true, then neutrality is impossible (cf. Matt. 12:30). By forcing Christians to answer under the assumption that neutrality is possible, the question demands we concede something we should reject from the outset.
2. "People in those religions are just as certain they are in the right place as you."
You can't know that, since no one has epistemic access to another's degree of certainty. At best, we only know how confident they claim to be. But even if we granted equal certainty, what follows? Confidence doesn't determine truth. People can be utterly convinced of a falsehood. Certainty is a subjective internal state, and precisely because it's subjective it is irrelevant to the objective question of which religion is true.
3. "If you haven't given them a fair chance, how can you be certain they aren't more true than Christianity?"
This question is like suggesting something could be further north than the North Pole. If Christianity is true, nothing can be "more true" than true. The question only makes sense if Christianity is false—a controversial premise that no Christian should grant, and one that cannot be established without begging the question (as indicated above).
I recently encountered a similar kind of question that targeted Christians. At first glance, it sounds fair-minded. But in reality it carries a hidden premise which no Christian should grant—that neutrality is both possible and necessary for religious truth. By answering the question as framed, you end up conceding its most controversial premise.
I find that most Christians were both (a) born into Christian families and (b) have not read the sacred texts of other religions. How can you be sure your religion is the correct one if you have not weighed other religions neutrally against Christianity?
People in those religions are just as certain they are in the right place as you. Those religions also have reports of miracles and divine manifestations. If you haven't given them a fair chance, how can you be certain they aren't more true than Christianity?
1. "How can you be sure your religion is the correct one if you have not weighed other religions neutrally against Christianity?"
This is a case of the Complex Question fallacy. The question smuggles in a hidden premise, namely, that one can weigh religions "neutrally." But that is precisely the point at issue. If Christianity is true, then neutrality is impossible (cf. Matt. 12:30). By forcing Christians to answer under the assumption that neutrality is possible, the question demands we concede something we should reject from the outset.
2. "People in those religions are just as certain they are in the right place as you."
You can't know that, since no one has epistemic access to another's degree of certainty. At best, we only know how confident they claim to be. But even if we granted equal certainty, what follows? Confidence doesn't determine truth. People can be utterly convinced of a falsehood. Certainty is a subjective internal state, and precisely because it's subjective it is irrelevant to the objective question of which religion is true.
3. "If you haven't given them a fair chance, how can you be certain they aren't more true than Christianity?"
This question is like suggesting something could be further north than the North Pole. If Christianity is true, nothing can be "more true" than true. The question only makes sense if Christianity is false—a controversial premise that no Christian should grant, and one that cannot be established without begging the question (as indicated above).
