Opening Post (3 of 4)
In post #1, I stated the following.
Third, the charge of "arbitrary" needs a definition. What is meant by "arbitrary?" And does unconditional election actually lead to an arbitrary decision? These two question are the subjection of the third portion.
In this third installment of the opening post, I'll be focused upon the word itself; and I will examine whether or not unconditional election actually leads to the conclusion of an arbitrary decision. For those who may wish to catch up on the different installments of the opening post, feel free to read post #1 (1 of 4) and post #58 (2 of 4).
Examining the Charge of "Arbitrary"
This may very well be the most significant section of the four, since it deals with the objection most directly. The main points of this section are are really rather simple: (1) definition, and (2) is the charge legitimate. So let us jump into it.
First, the definition of the word "arbitrary" needs to be considered. Like many words, the term "arbitrary" has a semantic range. This just means that several different nuances or meanings are attached to the word. I will be utilizing the definition provided by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary website.
[1]
The
third definition of the term relates to law. The website says, "depending on individual
discretion (as of a judge) and not fixed by law." If this definition were pursued. Then the objection would be trying to connect the unconditional nature of God's choice to being up to God's personal discretion. This route would make a rather poor argument, since all Calvinists and Calvinism as a system holds God to be perfect in knowledge. Thusly, it would not be a problem for God to exercise the best and most competent personal discretion when making a decision that does not take into account a person's faith, good deeds, or merit into the equation. This could hardly be called a criticism of Calvinism, if this nuance of the term were used.
The
second definition of the term relates to absoluteness. The website says, "not restrained or limited in the exercise of power
: ruling by absolute authority". The second definition also has a secondary nuance that focuses in upon the reality that often various dictators and governing bodies have functioned absolutely. Sometimes this results in tyranny. This is one of the reasons why the US government utilizes checks and balances (or at least this was the ideal) where the judicial, legislative, and executive branches all limit one another. In this case, then the argument would be that because God does not take into account a person's faith, good deeds, or merit into His consideration when choosing whom to save, then God's choice would be absolute and unrestrained in authority and power.
The
first definition of the term seems most likely to fit the context of those who employ the objection. The website says, "existing or coming about seemingly at random or by chance or as a
capricious and unreasonable act of will." If we follow this definition, then the argument would be as follows. God does not take into account a person's faith, good deeds, or merit into His consideration when choosing whom to same; this would mean that His choice would be reasonless, capricious, and seemingly random. This would be a much more substantial accusation in comparison to the other three. If true, then the argument would be saying that Calvinistic unconditional election amounts to an attack upon the character of God, in the form of attacking His perfect wisdom.
Second, we need to examine if the charge is legitimate. At the outset, I'll state it plainly. The charge is not legitimate, and unconditional election does not result in capricious, seemingly random choices in God. Unconditional election does not result in the sinful tyranny we see from dictatorial monarchs. And the third definition does not seem worth mentioning. However, with all that stated, what has led to that conclusion? The following are some reasons why I believe it is a non-sequitur fallacy to leap from unconditional election to the conclusion of arbitrariness on God's part.
The
first reason concerns the second definition of arbitrary. I have personally encountered a poster who tried desperately to salvage his argument by appealing to this nuance of the term "arbitrary." However, this response is rather rare. I've only encountered it once. The reason here is simple. Certainly, God is absolute. He is the ultimate being of the universe. His is the ruler over all. The Bible affirms these. The Bible also affirms that God is holy. On account of these simple considerations of God's character--considerations which all Calvinists hold--God's absolute power does not mean that He is the same as a sinful human. God is holy. God is not going to be tyrannical. Hence, the only persuasive power this version of the "arbitrary" argument can hold is from a guilt by association fallacy. The comparison might be made to human dictators who were clearly evil and unrestrained; however, God is not a man. And God is holy. Thus, His absoluteness is not a blight upon Him.
The
second reason pertains to the natures of humans and God. We have a massive category difference. Human beings can be negatively accused of playing god; this usually takes place when a human decides to take the life of another. However, God is actually God. He doesn't play God; rather, He is God. Thusly, He has certain rights and privileges as the Creator and judge of all. In Romans 12, for example, God tells us to not take vengeance precisely because God Himself has said, "Vengeance is mine." Since God is God, He sets up the rules. God Himself is the ultimate standard and the ultimate judge. It is a blight upon sinful men to be called tyrants, but it is not a blight upon God to be God.
The
third reason addresses the first definition of "arbitrary." The persuasive power of the objection comes from the fact that certain considerations are removed from grounding God's choice/election of certain people to salvation. Simply wording the previous sentence in the way it was almost already answers the issue. Note, "certain considerations" does not mean "all considerations." Just because certain considerations (a person's faith, good deeds, or merit) are removed as a reason for God's choice does not mean that all considerations are removed as a ground for God's choice. The negation of those considerations does not mean then that God has abosolutely no reason whatsoever for His choice to save certain individuals. The magnification of His grace is one such reason. Note what has already been stated in the first and second installment regarding grace and God's nature (post #1 & #58).
Finally, this leads me to conclude that the false accusation of "arbitrary," in any deragatory way, is nothing less than a non-sequitur fallacy. The nature of unconditional election does not lead to the conclusion of "arbitrary". The charge of "arbitrary" simply does not follow. Thusly, it is a non-sequitur fallacy.
In the final installment, I'll be addressing the assumptions of the accusation back to the one who sent it, for it reveals a great deal about the objector.
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[1] One can easily access this website through a simple google search, so the link has not been provided. Please feel free to fact check me by going to the website.
(Opening Post 3 of 4)
