No, it does not say the same thing. Is there any continuity between the Son and the Nazarene regarding his intellect? How about his affect? Volition? Is a continuity or a discontinuity being asserted with the assertion Jesus of Nazareth is situated at a particular point in history?
A continuity or discontinuity between what and what?
Regarding continuity: The person of the Son is always and forever the same; the one who eternally exists as God is the same person who now exists also as man.
Regarding discontinuity: His human nature with its intellect, affect, and will came into being in time; those faculties are created, finite, and proper to his humanity, not eternal attributes of the divine essence. Ergo, there is a continuity of person (the same "who") and a distinction of natures (two different "whats").
For example, the Son who knows all things eternally, now as the incarnate Jesus also knows temporally through a human mind (discursive and experiential). Or the Son as God is impassible, incapable of emotional fluctuation or suffering in his divine essence, yet as man he experiences genuine human affectivity (joy, sorrow, anger, compassion, grief, etc.). This is a
communicatio idiomatum—the person suffers albeit according to the human nature. We can truly say, "God suffered," not because the divine nature suffered but because the divine person as man did.
Argumentum ad nauseam. You're simply repeating the premise you need to prove.
Wait, I need to prove the Son became incarnate as Jesus? Or that Jesus is not found in the OT but the Son is? What premise am I supposedly repeating?
Honestly, Josh, you really need to stop firing off the names of logical fallacies and moving on, with no attempt to connect it to anything specific I had claimed or argued.
Note to readers and moderators: I think argumentum ad nauseam refers to the proof by assertion fallacy, a rhetorical technique of wearing down discussion until others disengage, exploiting fatigue to construe mere persistence as proof of correctness, or pretending that a claim becomes true, credible, or accepted simply because it has been stated over and over. Neither of these are applicable here.
Moreover, the Son becoming incarnate as Jesus of Nazareth, or Jesus not being found in the OT while God the Son is, this is basic Christianity 101 stuff—which is why I asserted it without argument. After all, I was addressing a knowledgeable Christian. An argument certainly can be made, though. It would just surprise me if it was needed. (Relatedly, the idea that something was added to the Godhead in the incarnation is an ancient theological error that I was surprised to hear a mature Christian suggest. I think it was Eutychianism? Or maybe Apollinarianism. I can't remember. I could look it up if this ends up being pressed.)
It's not Jesus' divinity that is in question and spouting doctrine, not reconciling scripture. Part of the problem lies in the portion of the text you've bold-faced. There are no distinctions in his two natures. He was (always) known in two natures. To suggest Jesus was not (always) known in both natures, or to suggest he became known in a distinct way previously unknown, is to compromise divine omniscience. There is only one single, solitary specific point Philippians 2 cites: his taking on human appearance in the form of a bondservant. It asserts no other change.
1. "There are no distinctions in his two natures."
This is an outright denial of Chalcedonian Christology. The entire point of the Definition of Chalcedon (AD 451) is that Christ is
one person in two distinct natures. To suggest the natures are not distinct is to find oneself in serious theological error. And it is indeed
Eutychianism—hours later I looked it up—named after a fifth-century monk. Eutychian monophysitism teaches
that Christ possesses only one nature, that the divine nature of Christ swallows up or absorbs the human nature of Jesus, such that he is left with but one theanthropic nature (from the Greek theos, “God,” and anthrōpos, “man”). ... If the divine nature of Christ absorbs the human nature of Christ, we are left with a composite nature that is neither truly human nor truly divine. (Ligonier.org)
The orthodox formula is that one and the same Son of God is "acknowledged in two natures
unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; the difference of the natures being in no way removed because of the union, but rather the properties of each nature being preserved, and [both] concurring into one person and one hypostasis."
Ergo, there absolutely are distinctions in the two natures—but without separation in the person. Denying that distinction is heretical by every classical standard, from
Leo's Tome (the document that shaped the Council of Chalcedon's definition of Christ's two natures) to the
Westminster Confession of Faith (
8.2).
2. "He was always known in two natures."
This idea is theologically incoherent at best. Before the incarnation there was no human nature for the Son to be known in; the human nature had not yet been created (i.e., baby Jesus in the sacred womb of Mary). To say the Son "was always known in two natures" (a) collapses divine omniscience into some kind of ontological simultaneity, or (b) conflates divine knowledge with ontological reality, collapsing the Creator–creature distinction, or (c) implies that human nature is eternal, which is absurd, or (d) implies that the divine nature has a latent humanity within it, which contradicts divine simplicity. At every turn is another error historically condemned by the church.
3. "To suggest he became known in a distinct way previously unknown is to compromise divine omniscience."
No, it is to distinguish between God's knowledge and its manifestation in the created order. God eternally knows the incarnation, but
the incarnation itself is temporal, taking place in history, not eternity. Omniscience does not nullify the distinction between eternal decree and temporal execution. For example, God eternally knew the Exodus, yet the Exodus was not eternal but temporally situated. Likewise, the Son eternally knows the incarnation but becoming incarnate is a temporal act
ad extra, not a modification
ad intra. Let's not confuse
knowing with
being. God's foreknowledge does not entail the eternal existence of temporal realities.
- The Son eternally exists in the form of God.
- In time, without change to the divine essence, he assumes human nature.
- Thus, the person (the "who") is eternal; the human nature (the "what") is temporal.
- The divine omniscience eternally knows this temporal event, but that does not make the event eternal.
Again, as I said, "The Son of God has always existed (and even defines existence). Jesus of Nazareth, however—the incarnation of the Son, the assumption of a human nature—is situated at a particular point in redemptive history."
4. "Philippians 2 asserts no other change."
Correct—but that actually supports my statement, not yours. Philippians 2 explicitly describes the Son taking on the form of a bondservant
- as an act of assumption, not modification,
and (because apparently I need to state the obvious)
- it pertains to the Son, not the Godhead.
So, the text seems to teach exactly what I said: The eternal Son, already existing in the form of God, assumed a human nature at a particular point in time (c. 5 BCE).
Note: I will be on the road for three days, with limited access to the internet. It will be some time before I can reply to any response. Please be patient. You know this happens with me from time to time.
