Water, microwaves and letters or numbers do not have volition. The existence of two or more wills matters..... especially if can establish new causation, even more so if that is God's intent from the beginning.
Nobody I know here is saying that wills do not matter. But there is only one will that can establish new causation. It is logically self-contradictory, if God is first cause, to say that any creature/any sentient (other than God)/any other will, can cause or be a new first-cause by God's intent. It is also anthropomorphic. But if my opponent only means that the will of sentient creatures does have effects, I agree completely. That the lines of cause and effect branch out at the point of decision, is not disputed. I don't think I have ever said otherwise.
Part of the problem is that this debate (like that of soteriology) has been framed in its poles or the extremes. Creation MUST be either all, entirely, completely controlled and nothing else can explain creation because to do so would compromise divine might and sovereignty, or creation MUST be completely autonomous and nothing else can explain creation because to do so would compromise human culpability, make God a despot, the language of scripture is meaningless and we therefore then left in the blinding utter darkness of ignorance because we cannot possibly fathom the meaning of God's words as God uses them or we can invent any meaning we mean and attribute it to God.
That entire thing is a mess.
I think only one reader here has claimed that it is framed at its extremes. I wonder what word there is for that psychological phenomenon, that tends to take what it hears and express it back as an extreme. I am a compatibilist, much as I dislike that handle, (because I am not quite in agreement with what some people think is compatibilism). I do indeed claim the one extreme (determinism) but not at the expense of the fact of and effects of the volition of the creature. I also do not think that all those who disagree with me are mere deists (the other extreme), nor that they all claim creation (nor even willed creatures) must be completely autonomous.
It's much easier to observe the problems on the human-centric side of that debate but meticulous determinism also has its obvious flaws.
At this point in this contention, I hesitate to ask anyone to demonstrate (not just describe by way of definition of words, nor by presuppositions that are supported by those same presuppositions) any logical flaws of meticulous determinism. If this contentious communication continues I may as well just shut this thread down.
Hence the debate. Compatibilists have attempted to find the neglected middle and the Reform-minded among them have done so preserving and emphasizing divine sovereignty over human volitional agency. Sadly, much of the reasoning allowing human weight has neglected or ignored the pre-disobedient/post-disobedient divide found in scripture. The mere mention of the single pre-disobedient decision made in scripture cause the thread to derail and difficulty getting it back on topic. Arguments over the meaning of words would be readily addressed and easily resolved if and when God's definitions are found and provided but it appears this op wants and enjoys the silence of God and uses it as a defense against criticism. Scripture uses the words "life" and "death" in multiple ways and the reason we know that is because scripture also defines all the uses for us. That does not exist with the words "choice," and "possibility," so determinists think they've achieved something or gotten away with their defense when it amounts to an argument from silence and does nothing to address the hole in the case for determinism.
Admittedly, determinism has for its argument, its own presupposition(s), as does any other framework, that all things post-first-cause's-creating are effects of that creating. The determinist, if he even considers that he is depending on that presupposition, finds it an altogether logical and reasonable claim, and axiomatic. If, (with which I disagree), that presupposition logically results in no valid choice of the will, then ...but I hesitate to ask again. I do not wish to extend contentious discourse.
As far as I can tell from the posts, there are no indeterminists present in the (non-)discussion. We all believe in some degree of determinism. In theory, we should be able to reason through the correct degree of determinism among ourselves but that would mean every single one of us would probably 1) have to change something in our own understanding and 2) let go of previously held doctrinal and sectarian allegiances without insulting each other.
Why must determinism be a matter of degree? I happily, even joyfully, insist that the truth is not dependent on anything man can come up with to handle God's deeds and ways. I don't even like the term, 'determinism'. I certainly don't think my rendition of the facts as I see them fit what God sees. I'm only saying "this is what my reason comes up with". I can do no other, so far. The truth does not accommodate itself to anything we think, no matter how accurate, articulate or apt our thoughts and descriptions are. The truth does not fit on any scale between two man-described extremes.
Your 1) and 2) above are noble endeavors indeed.
For centuries the soteriological debate was framed entirely as a matter of volition. Very few, if any, asked, "What if the sinner's volition is irrelevant?" and answered that question, "The sinner's will is not relevant." The synergist cannot tolerate that at all because it falls on the monergist side of the divide and the monergist can tolerate it only as far as regeneration precedes faith while they still engage the debate over volition when their response should be, "Meh." The minute the question is asked both sides become allied in resistance to the answer and a slew of what-abouts ensue. It doesn't help that some/many on both sides acting like the unsaved.
I mean this sincerely: I would like to hear your claim I thought I heard you make, not that the sinner's will is irrelevant, but that the will [of the creature] is irrelevant, juxtaposed with the claim that the fact of the creature's will must not be denied in logical determinism. Hopefully, I heard you wrong, and you only intended what you said in the context of soteriology and referred to the sinner's will, and not human volition in general. If that is all you meant, I concur. In monergism, the sinner's will is not violated, but God by himself gives the sinner new birth, 'from above', by which the sinner's will is rendered no longer at enmity with God. The sinner's will is regenerated, but was irrelevant in causing that regeneration.
What if the nature of creation is not found in the poles? What if it is not found in a dichotomized causality? Fodder for another op because this op is about proving determinism and we're seven pages in and this op has not provided an impeccable case proving its position. This op started with a circular question. Words mean what they mean when God uses them, and the meaning of the word "choice" means - not implies - more than one possibility exists. It's ironic because western dictionaries are informed by the Bible. The idea Oxford or Merriam's has invented a definition apart from God is ironic and untenable on multiple levels if the goal is to prove determinism. That argument words have different meaning when used by God and none of us do nor can know the truth was always a nonsensical argument.
I didn't say they developed their definitions apart from God. I said they developed definitions that describe man's point of view. They do not describe FACT, as such, but what man thinks of fact.
As an analogy, the science writers like to say that some particles pop in and out of existence by themselves and randomly, and even the math used to describe the phenomenon attempts to formulate predictability. It is an admission of, "We don't know". That math may be more useful for that purpose of making predictions than classical physics is, but it does not describe what God sees. We use words like, 'possible', because WE don't know.
My opponent here wishes to say that I have not demonstrated a reasonable argument in support of my version of determinism, though I demand the same of my opposition. Granted, I presuppose comprehensive, meticulous and intimate causation post-creation (whether via creation or via immanence or both). I think I have even defended that presupposition sufficiently, but I'll back off of that, unless that question is further pursued by my opposition. But if logic follows that presupposition, I find no alternative but to believe that even our wills, and all decisions made by our wills, minds and bodies are caused, without need to suppose anything resembling first-cause status to our wills. If, on the other hand, logic does not follow that presupposition, I have yet to hear anything to deny my thesis, except by denial of that presupposition.
My opponent has proposed as axiomatic, put simply, that strict* determinism denies choice. I find that a statement by fiat alone. It does not replace my presupposition. It only ignores it.
*'Strict' is my word, there. I don't remember what word or phrase or what my opponent used in describing the sort of determinism he thinks I espouse, and I'm too lazy to go look for it.
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