Does choice imply more than one actual possibility?

[makesends]

Accurate but not valid?

Broad brush much? Accurate to what man means by it, but not according to fact —according to what God sees.

 

[makesends]

Progress was gained by establishing and then addressing the distinction between correct definition and the validity of the correctly defined word.

Well done. That was nearly accurate. "...the distinction between correct"-to-human-concept vs the validity of that concept as applied to (or drawn from) that word. Of all people, (I should think), a psych specialist would know there's more than one use of a word. God does not think how we do, and the dictionary does not attempt to tell us what God sees.

 

[Hobie]

That is the choice we are faced with today, repent and be saved, or continue in sin and die in perdition....

It is at the core of the battle of choice, one gives you life, the other eternal death. Both are possibilities, until you choose, and God allows you free will to choose. Christ gives you the possibility to choose, as certain death was all we had before His sacrifice at the cross...

 

[John Bauer]

If God determines absolutely everything, then the choice was determined. That means it's not an actual choice. … Nothing is voluntary if absolutely everything is determined by God.

This line of reasoning stands on a hidden premise—that a choice is only a choice if it is undetermined (or self-determined in a contra-causal sense). This simply begs the question against compatibilism which, by definition, rejects that premise.

(This also makes a mess of moral responsibility. A will that is not determined by nature, reasons, or desires is not free in a meaningful sense; it is arbitrary. But that is a different nut to crack in a separate thread.)

Determined and choice are not mutually exclusive categories. This is about unforced choice, not uncaused choice. A determined event can still be a deliberate, intentional, desire-expressing act—because causal determination is not the same thing as coercion or compulsion.

“Does choice imply more than one actual possibility exists?”

Yes. The word “choice” literally means a selection can be made from two or more possibilities!

That word (possibilities) is exploiting an ambiguity that needs to be clarified. In ordinary language, choice presupposes that the agent considers more than one option—chocolate or strawberry, reason x or reason y, coffee or tea, call in sick or go to work. Those are deliberative possibilities, objects of evaluation, intention, desire. Compatibilists fully affirm this category of possibility.

Your answer tacitly introduces a stronger claim, that choice entails metaphysical possibilities (i.e., multiple metaphysically open outcomes) in the moment. That does not follow from the ordinary meaning of the word choice—i.e., that isn’t what it “literally” means. It is a philosophical add-on. Lexically, choice means something like “the act of selecting or deciding.” It doesn’t encode a causal theory or modal metaphysics, and dictionaries don’t define choice as requiring indeterminism or multiple causally open futures.

Choice requires deliberative possibilities, not metaphysical possibilities.

At the moment of choice, only one outcome is actualizable, given the total state of affairs and God’s eternal decree. Nevertheless, a range of outcomes is possible relative to the agent’s deliberative perspective—“If I choose P, then x will occur; if I choose ¬P, then ¬x will occur.” This conditional structure—grounded in the agent’s reasons, intentions, desires, and volition—is sufficient for genuine choosing and for moral significance. And it doesn’t require denying determinism.

 

[John Bauer]

Feynman says, "IF time is a dimension"—not, "since" it is. I'm wondering what the context there is.

It is just a conditional statement, akin to saying, “Given x, such-and-such must logically follow.” He does believe time is a dimension. “The universe is a block of events,” he said, “a four-dimensional loaf of bread,” with time being one of those dimensions. He believes “time is a flexible, relative, bendy dimension rather than a strict metronome.”

Does he believe that the past, present and future all exist simultaneously?

Yes.

According to AI, distance equals rate times time.

And it was correct. The formula (d = r × t) is a fundamental relationship in classical (Newtonian) physics grounded in Euclidean geometry. So, the formula holds only within its domain of application. If you inferred that “distance always equals rate times time” for all forms of motion, that would be overgeneralized—because we live in a four-dimensional manifold. The formula holds only under classical, non-relativistic, strictly local (flat geometry), and constant-velocity conditions. Attempting to apply it globally (across varying rates, curved paths, or relativistic or cosmological scales) results in physical and conceptual errors.

Does this mean that distance is not its own dimension, and disappears if time disappears? I understand it is a stupid question, but I need some clarity here.

Distance doesn’t depend on time; motion does. Distance doesn’t disappear if time disappears; what disappears is speed and motion.

I see time as effecting and affecting results in THIS temporal universe, …

Feynman addressed that in the video:

This is where your intuition fights back. You say, “Okay, but surely time acts on things. Time makes me get older. Time causes the milk to spoil.”

No, it doesn’t. This is a linguistic trap. Time is not an agent. Time doesn’t have hands. It doesn’t reach into the fridge and sour your milk. Bacteria do that. Chemical reactions do that. Entropy does that. Time is just the bookkeeping system we use to track the rate at which those things happen. Saying time did it is like saying inches built the house. Inches didn’t build anything. Carpenters did. Inches just tell you where the walls are. Time is the ruler, not the worker.

 

[QVQ]

Again, the existence of Adam and the existence of the fruit are not the subject of this thread. The nature of their existence relevant to choice, possibility, and determinism is the subject.

The world I live in:
A person is driving and the gas gauge is reading empty (State)
There are gas stations on each corner where the person can stop (Options)
Those options are provided by circumstance (Providence)
The person must choose an option (Forced Choice)
The person also has the option to keep driving
The person runs out of gas and stops
In the State in which the person exists, the person will Stop (No Choice)

In the Sate in which a person abides, the person has options that are circumstantial but that person does not have choice.
If there isn't any Choice there isn't any Will.
There are options within circumstances that a person may select but whatever the person chooses ,the ultimate outcome is determined.
A person must Stop to get gas or keep going until he runs out of gas and Stop
The fundamental State determines Stop even though the person has options to select.

Once the selection is made, then the circumstances and the options change. But the options are along a path and will result in the same outcome whichever selection is made. There is a path that options and selections follow along.
The selection of options does not change the path

 

[makesends]

And it was correct. The formula (d = r × t) is a fundamental relationship in classical (Newtonian) physics grounded in Euclidean geometry. So, the formula holds only within its domain of application. If you inferred that “distance always equals rate times time” for all forms of motion, that would be overgeneralized—because we live in a four-dimensional manifold. The formula holds only under classical, non-relativistic, strictly local (flat geometry), and constant-velocity conditions. Attempting to apply it globally (across varying rates, curved paths, or relativistic or cosmological scales) results in physical and conceptual errors.

That rings true. While there are a lot of things I still don't get, and while I don't trust AI to get everything right (it didn't cite its sources), it says that expanding universe doesn't stretch time but does stretch distance. It said that bent light around a massive object takes longer than it would have taken if that object had not been there, because it is a longer distance. (I don't know if it got that by reason or by explicit source.) (That last, it seems to me should be testable, by red/blue shifting proportionally by the longer/shorter routes.)

Distance doesn’t depend on time; motion does. Distance doesn’t disappear if time disappears; what disappears is speed and motion.

THAT was my original question. Distance can be described AS r x t, but it would be misstated to say distance IS r x t.

Feynman addressed that in the video:

This is where your intuition fights back. You say, “Okay, but surely time acts on things. Time makes me get older. Time causes the milk to spoil.”

No, it doesn’t. This is a linguistic trap. Time is not an agent. Time doesn’t have hands. It doesn’t reach into the fridge and sour your milk. Bacteria do that. Chemical reactions do that. Entropy does that. Time is just the bookkeeping system we use to track the rate at which those things happen. Saying time did it is like saying inches built the house. Inches didn’t build anything. Carpenters did. Inches just tell you where the walls are. Time is the ruler, not the worker.

Very good. Thanks.

Applying this back to the OP, there are a lot of implications relevant to the way we think. Cause-and-effect is, (as far as we can tell), sequential, but not time-dependent.

Cause-and-effect has solid logical progression, but we don't create our kids. They come from us, but they also are made by God. Our choices (whether deliberate, coerced or by accident) resulted in a new young person, just as determination via cause-and-effect requires, whether we foresaw that result or not.

For what it is worth, @Josheb , to be able to say, "That was decreed", after the fact of seeing what happened, would be circular as proof of determinism. I agree with you there —well, I do unless that too is a misstatement of your complaint on that question. I use it only as notation of what causation theory (to me) demands. Also, in my version of determinism God does not, as some claim determinism requires, do anything for its own sake, except the end, and even that is for HIS sake.

All events DID happen. God spoke them all into existence. But the end is better than the beginning.

 

[Josheb]

This line of reasoning stands on a hidden premise—that a choice is only a choice if it is undetermined (or self-determined in a contra-causal sense). This simply begs the question against compatibilism which, by definition, rejects that premise.

(This also makes a mess of moral responsibility. A will that is not determined by nature, reasons, or desires is not free in a meaningful sense; it is arbitrary. But that is a different nut to crack in a separate thread.)

Determined and choice are not mutually exclusive categories. This is about unforced choice, not uncaused choice. A determined event can still be a deliberate, intentional, desire-expressing act—because causal determination is not the same thing as coercion or compulsion.

While I appreciate that contribution, it is mostly irrelevant to my position and, in parts, incorrect.

I have not said choices are undetermined. I have, in fact, stated there are many influences influencing (not determining or forcing) any/every moment of choice (so any implication I have argued an "undetermined" choice would be a misrepresentation of my posts. The more important aspect, however, is the fact humans have an extraordinary to act in antithesis to all their influences. I was inclined to say, "known influences," but the fact is we act in opposition to unknown influences, too. It might be argued this is still a determined choice because it's simply a choice of antithesis, which would not exist without some thesis, or set of theses, but that still supports my position. For the record, I have NOT argued for autonomous choices. I have argued against one specific type of determinism, the kind of linear, singular, incompatibilism often asserted by @makesends. It is not that determinism does not exist (it does) it is that his view of determinism is the incorrect determinism. His is the determinism of an action-figure-making god. The "choices" of the action figures are not actually choices... they are determinisms. They are not "determined choices," they are themselves determinisms. The "choice" is a choice in name only. It is a meaningless label.

 

[Josheb]

Well done. That was nearly accurate. "...the distinction between correct"-to-human-concept vs the validity of that concept as applied to (or drawn from) that word. Of all people, (I should think), a psych specialist would know there's more than one use of a word. God does not think how we do, and the dictionary does not attempt to tell us what God sees.

Just so you know, I read your last eight posts. In doing so I read more of the same fallacy laden sophistry so, as I said previously, I won't be responding further unless or until I read something that 1) addresses the point I have posted and 2) moves the conversation forward. I'll not contribute to ad nauseam. Reflecting on Posts 64 & 64 will be beneficial.

 

[Josheb]

The world I live in:
A person is driving and the gas gauge is reading empty (State)
There are gas stations on each corner where the person can stop (Options)
Those options are provided by circumstance (Providence)
The person must choose an option (Forced Choice)
The person also has the option to keep driving
The person runs out of gas and stops
In the State in which the person exists, the person will Stop (No Choice)

In the Sate in which a person abides, the person has options that are circumstantial but that person does not have choice.
If there isn't any Choice there isn't any Will.
There are options within circumstances that a person may select but whatever the person chooses ,the ultimate outcome is determined.
A person must Stop to get gas or keep going until he runs out of gas and Stop
The fundamental State determines Stop even though the person has options to select.

Once the selection is made, then the circumstances and the options change. But the options are along a path and will result in the same outcome whichever selection is made. There is a path that options and selections follow along.
The selection of options does not change the path

What's your question?

I also recommend you read through Post 66 critically. A person who does not have a choice does not have options. The word "choice" means options exist and can be selected. An absence of choice is equal to an absence of options. AND the Post 66's scenario provides five stated choices (and few unstated ones). The post conflates the moment and the type of choice with the choice itself. False dichotomy. Re-read it. Think it through. Make the necessary corrections because.....

...that's not the world in which you live . That is the world you perceive .

 

[QVQ]

I also recommend you read through Post 66 critically. A person who does not have a choice does not have options. The word "choice" means options exist and can be selected. An absence of choice is equal to an absence of options. AND the Post 66's scenario provides five stated choices (and few unstated ones). The post conflates the moment and the type of choice with the choice itself. False dichotomy. Re-read it. Think it through. Make the necessary corrections because.....

...that's not the world in which you live . That is the world you perceive .

I stand by my post #66

A) Choice as an expression of free will and agency:
Individual's inherent ability to exert their will and make decisions without external constraints, even in abstract situations not bound by a specific list of options.

B) Selection as a structured, constrained process:
Decisions are limited to a predefined set of options and often require a rational, evaluative process to determine the "best" fit based on certain criteria.

1) You cannot choose, and by exertion of will, gas up your car in the supermarket produce dept. There are external contraints by a predefined specific list of criteria. options Therefore Selection and Option are the correct term in Post #66
2) Forced choice is not choice
3) If secection X and Y are identical in essence, X or Y can be selected, but there isn't any choice betwixt the two

If I "choose" chocolate or vanilla ice cream, the essence remains the same so ice cream is the State and flavor is an Option to be Selected.
Now in the beginning, notice I "chose" ice cream but in the greater scheme of thing, ice cream was an option to be selected rather than yogurt
The First Choice and Will is God who arranges providence and the selections therein. (Providence Circumstances)
Even while we select from all available option (providence) we do not fundamentally change the path, as God has ordained.
After the person stops for gas, the options and selections change but the subsequent options and selections are all along the same path.
No matter which option was chosen in Post #66, the person will still be going down the same highway.

 

[makesends]

I stand by my post #66

A) Choice as an expression of free will and agency:
Individual's inherent ability to exert their will and make decisions without external constraints, even in abstract situations not bound by a specific list of options.

B) Selection as a structured, constrained process:
Decisions are limited to a predefined set of options and often require a rational, evaluative process to determine the "best" fit based on certain criteria.

1) You cannot "choose" by your "will" to gas up your car in the produce market of the supermarket. There are external contraints by a predefined specific list of options Therefore Selection and Option are the correct term in Post #66
2) forced choice is not choice
3) If secection X and Y are identical in essence there isn't any choice betwixt the two

If I "choose" chocolate or vanilla ice cream, the essence remains the same so ice cream is the State and flavor is an Option to be Selected.
Now in the beginning, notice I "chose" ice cream but in the greater scheme of thing, ice cream was an option to be selected rather than yogurt
The First Choice and Will is God who arranges providence and the selections therein. (Providence Circumstances)
Even while we select from all available option (providence) we do not fundamentally change the path, as God has ordained.
After the person stops for gas, the options and selections change but the subsequent options and selections are all along the same path.
No matter which option was chosen in Post #66, the person will still be going down the same highway.

A) At least one dictionary uses a vague term, "constraint", in defining 'freewill'. I wish I could find it, but... Anyhow, the definition seemed to me to attempt to walk both sides of the fence, to satisfy just about anybody's notion of what 'freewill' can mean. "Without constraint" can mean, "without being forced", and it can mean, "without being influenced". Regardless, I think it is important to mention what should be obvious to all, that the fact a dictionary defines a word the way it does, does not of itself lend that concept credibility. We can say, "What is freewill?", and by doing so assume that in fact, that our version of free will IS, when in fact it may not be. So too with words like 'choice', 'option' and 'possible', we might assume by the definition given, that the philosophy behind that definition is valid.

If we have no better word than, "choice" (and its variants), to refer to what one does in exercising his will, we can discuss it, not only by the dictionary definition(s), but as it should have been described. The Britannica AI on 'freewill' begins by saying, "free will, in philosophy and science, the supposed power or capacity of humans to make decisions or perform actions independently of any prior event or state of the universe." (my emphasis). It does the same with the word, "choice". To me, at least, this opens the term up to differences of opinion as to what it really IS.



2) Can you give an example of what you mean by "forced choice"? For example, Coercion may be called 'forced choice', but a choice made under coercion is still a choice.

3) If x and y are identical, why do you mention this? But if one is called x and one is called y, they aren't identical. And if they are otherwise identical, that alone (that one is called x and one is called y) is enough to require choice, since they are two. But maybe you are referring to something else that I'm not following.

 

[QVQ]

The Britannica AI on 'freewill' begins by saying, "free will, in philosophy and science, the supposed power or capacity of humans to make decisions or perform actions independently of any prior event or state of the universe." (my emphasis). It does the same with the word, "choice". To me, at least, this opens the term up to differences of opinion as to what it really IS.

Freewill "independently of any prior event or state of the universe"
1) Please give example of a decision or action independent of the state of the universe.
And no decision or action is independent of prior event because as Freyman pointed out, now is a prior event in new clothes.

2) Can you give an example of what you mean by "forced choice"? For example, Coercion may be called 'forced choice', but a choice made under coercion is still a choice.

3) If x and y are identical, why do you mention this? But if one is called x and one is called y, they aren't identical. And if they are otherwise identical, that alone (that one is called x and one is called y) is enough to require choice, since they are two. But maybe you are referring to something else that I'm not following

2) Forced Choice Post #66 If the gas gauge is on empty, you must stop to refuel. The stop is a forced choice, as you are forced by circumstances to stop. It is not a selection because it is not an option. But by definition it is not a "choice" either. It is a State or circumstances in which a person is forced to act.
3) Essentially Same State X and Y
Vehicles
X Vehicle is State, selected option Red
Y Vehicle is State selected option Green
Y and Y are not two choices "vehicle." They are essentially the same.
One choice, vehicle 2 options selected red or green
And ultimately Vehicle is a selection as you could have selected roller skates or a hores as options previous to obtaining vehicle.

 

[John Bauer]

I have not said choices are undetermined. I have, in fact, stated there are many influences influencing (not determining or forcing) any/every moment of choice (so any implication I have argued an "undetermined" choice would be a misrepresentation of my posts). The more important aspect, however, is the fact humans have an extraordinary [ability] to act in antithesis to all their influences. (I was inclined to say known influences, but the fact is we act in opposition to unknown influences, too.)

First, the dispute is not about whether influences exist. Of course they do. The dispute is about causal sufficiency, whether the agent’s total motivational state at the moment of choice—beliefs, desires, values, character, reasons, dispositions, circumstances—is sufficient to explain why this choice occurred rather than another. Compatibilists answer yes. You, along with incompatibilists, answer no. (I am not calling you an incompatibilist; I am pointing out a shared commitment, namely, the denial of causal sufficiency and the discreet affirmation of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.)

Second, if influences do not determine—“there are many influences influencing (not determining or forcing)”—and if an agent can act in antithesis or contrary to the total set of causal forces and influences bearing on the will, both known and unknown, then what explains why one option is selected rather than another?

I can see how, on your account, these causal forces and influences may constitute necessary conditions of an action, but evidently they are not sufficient conditions, for the agent can act contrary to them all. That leaves the choice underdetermined by the agent, at which point only two explanatory options remain: The choice is explained by (a) something external to the agent, or (b) nothing sufficient at all, which yields arbitrariness. You have already ruled out the third option (something internal).

For the record, I have NOT argued for autonomous choices.

But it sounds like you have, which is why I quoted you. You affirm that choices are real while saying, “If God determines absolutely everything, then the choice was determined. That means it's not an actual choice.” And you affirm voluntary action while saying, “Nothing is voluntary if absolutely everything is determined by God.” The implication seems clear, so perhaps a clarification is in order. What is missing?

I have argued against one specific type of determinism, the kind of linear, singular, incompatibilism often asserted by makesends. It is not that determinism does not exist (it does) it is that his view of determinism is the incorrect determinism. His is the determinism of an action-figure-making god. The "choices" of the action figures are not actually choices; they are determinisms. They are not "determined choices," they are themselves determinisms. The "choice" is a choice in name only. It is a meaningless label.

You may be misrepresenting his view by calling it incompatibilism—he sounds like a compatibilist to me—but you are definitely misrepresenting his view by calling it “action-figure determinism,” a metaphor that implicitly denies what he explicitly affirms (that choices are real). An action figure has no internal motivational economy; a human agent does. That is a rhetorically effective strawman caricature of makesends’s theological beliefs which subsequently leaves his view unaddressed.

The action figure metaphor also illicitly assumes that determined willing is not real willing, which is the very point at issue. To say that determined choices are “choices in name only” is not an argument; it’s a stipulative definition designed to exclude compatibilism by fiat. That is bad form. This sort of thing is eristic pugilism, Josh, not dialogue that seeks mutual understanding and edification. At the very least, engage makesends’s views on its own terms. If those terms are unclear, seek clarification.

For instance, your term here when you said that choices are “determinisms.” That isn’t coherent English. Determinism doesn’t name a type of event; it is a thesis about relations between events. You expressed a category error that is not unlike saying “this sentence is grammar” or “that collision is physics.”

 

[John Bauer]

Coercion may be called “forced choice,” but a choice made under coercion is still a choice.

In fact, in such a scenario the coerced person is still choosing his greatest desire.

 

[makesends]

now is a prior event in new clothes.

I like that!

Freewill "independently of any prior event or state of the universe"
1) Please give example of a decision or action independent of the state of the universe.
And no decision or action is independent of prior event because as Freyman pointed out, now is a prior event in new clothes.

No sir I cannot. There is (according to my best logic) no such thing, but for First Cause himself.

2) Forced Choice Post #66 If the gas gauge is on empty, you must stop to refuel. The stop is a forced choice, as you are forced by circumstances to stop. It is not a selection because it is not an option. But by definition it is not a "choice" either. It is a State or circumstances in which a person is forced to act.

Ok, but it is still a choice. You will always choose according to your inclinations. In this case, your inclination is in your best interest. You could consider, instead, sitting in your car and crying, but you won't likely choose that. It is a choice. You could attempt to feel enough indignation or self-righteousness to prefer losing your life and your wallet, or, you could hand your wallet to the guy with the gun.

3) Essentially Same State X and Y
Vehicles
X Vehicle is State, selected option Red
Y Vehicle is State selected option Green
Y and Y are not two choices "vehicle." They are essentially the same.
One choice, vehicle 2 options selected red or green
And ultimately Vehicle is a selection as you could have selected roller skates or a hores as options previous to obtaining vehicle.

I'm guessing that's a typo: "Y and Y are not two choices 'vehicle'." I don't know what you mean —maybe, "X and Y are not two options"? Red is indeed a vehicle as is the Blue one, but they are not the same vehicle. It's still choosing when faced with two items and you can only have one of them. This seems so plain to me I must conclude that you mean to communicate something I just don't follow.

 

[makesends]

Second, if influences do not determine—“there are many influences influencing (not determining or forcing)”—and if an agent can act in antithesis or contrary to the total set of causal forces and influences bearing on the will, both known and unknown, then what explains why one option is selected rather than another?

I can see how, on your account, these causal forces and influences may constitute necessary conditions of an action, but evidently they are not sufficient conditions, for the agent can act contrary to them all. That leaves the choice underdetermined by the agent, at which point only two explanatory options remain: The choice is explained by (a) something external to the agent, or (b) nothing sufficient at all, which yields arbitrariness. You have already ruled out the third option (something internal).

Exactly so. Even if the agent could act against all [supposed] influences, there is no reason to suppose that rebellion, or madness, or some other influence did not influence him to do that. I daresay there are in perhaps EVERY situation myriad opposing influences toward any decision made—i.e. influences both in favor of and against.

Every result, results from something, and choice is a result of antecedent causes. Nothing happens in a vacuum.

 

[QVQ]

n fact, in such a scenario the coerced person is still choosing his greatest desire.

Whether a person puts fuel in the car when he is out of gas is not a choice. It is not an option
The only choice is to have the car stop and walk away.
Are you saying that is his greatest desire? Perhaps...

The OP states does choice imply more than one possibility
1) In the case above, if fueling the car is the choice then Stop is the only one possibility, unless you include towing or pushing.
Stop to refuel the car or don't refuel the car, it will stop Only possibility is Stop (1)
2) If the "choice" is whether or not the car will stop if it runs out of fuel, there isn't any choice and no other possibility.
Run out of pusholene, the car will stop. No choice no possibility (0)
3) IF the "choice" is where the car will stop then the combination of possibilities is infinity. The Stop becoming a verson of Shrodingers cat
Where the car stops is so uncertain that the possibility cannot be known until the stop actually happens (infinity)

 

[QVQ]

I'm guessing that's a typo: "Y and Y are not two choices 'vehicle'." I don't know what you mean —maybe, "X and Y are not two options"? Red is indeed a vehicle as is the Blue one, but they are not the same vehicle. It's still choosing when faced with two items and you can only have one of them. This seems so plain to me I must conclude that you mean to communicate something I just don't follow.

Yes Y and Y is a typo. Should be X and Y but it works for Y Y also.

The vehicle can be the same vehicle with the optional color selected red or green. Y Y
If you have two identical year models of a vehicle, X Y the two are basically the same vehicle without quibbling or checking the VIN Number so no choice and no selection if the vehicles are the same color and other selected options
The fundamental State is vehicle, the selected option is color. You could and probably will argue that color is choice but it does not change the fundamental state "vehicle" anymore than chocolate or vanilla ice cream changes the fundamental state "ice cream."

If there is a car X red, and it is being painted, the combination of possibilities is infinity. I had red trucks, numerous, different models and no two reds were ever the exact same shade. Again, shrodingers cat, the actuality of red is a infinite gamut of possible combinations that can only be resolved by the collapse into one actuality.

 

[makesends]

Yes Y and Y is a typo. Should be X and Y but it works for Y Y also.

The vehicle can be the same vehicle with the optional color selected red or green. Y Y
If you have two identical year models of a vehicle, X Y the two are basically the same vehicle without quibbling or checking the VIN Number so no choice and no selection if the vehicles are the same color and other selected options
The fundamental State is vehicle, the selected option is color. You could and probably will argue that color is choice but it does not change the fundamental state "vehicle" anymore than chocolate or vanilla ice cream changes the fundamental state "ice cream."

If there is a car X red, and it is being painted, the combination of possibilities is infinity. I had red trucks, numerous, different models and no two reds were ever the exact same shade. Again, shrodingers cat, the actuality of red is a infinite gamut of possible combinations that can only be resolved by the collapse into one actuality.

Since I don't understand just what you are getting at, I don't mean this to disagree with you, but:

Schrödinger's cat is a thought 'experiment', and illustrates a mindset/way of thinking. It does not illustrate reality. Are you talking about the way we think? Or are you talking about whether in reality, a choice is made or not?

What does "fundamental state" have to do with whether or not a choice has been made? I suppose you are attempting with your posts to get across your definition of 'choice', 'option', 'selection' etc but I'm just not following.