Not complicated: The classic Problem of Evil.
But which version? There is the logical problem of evil, the evidential problem of evil, the inductive problem of evil, etc.
So is God unaware (not omniscient)? Not able to do anything (not omnipotent)? Busy somewhere else (not omnipresent)?
None of the above—which is supposed to result in a problem, I think? But you haven’t identified one. God was present, aware, and had the power to do something. Okay, so what is the alleged problem?
See, there has to be a hidden premise at work. Is the argument that if God knows of, can prevent, and is present to an evil, then he is ontologically or perhaps morally obligated to prevent it? Is that the premise? If so, it is unargued (and false). It must be stated and defended, not merely assumed, because the whole argument hangs upon it.
After all, in Christian theism the worst evil in history was ordained by God for the salvation of the world.
And the analogy of the teenage boys falls apart for many reasons, not least of which is the fact that they delighted or took pleasure in the suffering—they “laughed as they filmed it”—which is what made the case so depraved. Christian theology says nothing of the kind about God. Scripture presents God as hating wickedness, as not predisposed to afflict or to grieve people, as judging justly, and yet ordaining whatsoever comes to pass for wise and holy ends. The same event can be evil in its proximate human intention and good in God’s ultimate intention (Gen. 50:20). Do we always know in any given case what that good is? No. But to conclude that there is, therefore, no such good is a non sequitur.
For me, which is more probable?
- God is an immoral monster.
- God does not exist.
And that is a false dilemma, of course, because there is a third option: God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil. Only if he doesn’t have a morally sufficient reason would the charge against his goodness have force. If he does, then the existence of evil is not evidence that he is a “monster.”
As a practical matter, this was not an empty philosophical question for me. When I was 8 years old, my closest friend at school was raped by his mother’s boyfriend. There is nothing in the experience of an 8 year old for them to draw on to allow them to help a friend deal with that level of pain. I was barely able to process the existence of that level of evil. So the question of evil, for me, was both real and empirical. I searched three years for an answer, eventually settling on a quote from Bertrand Russel as the best explanation: “The evidence of contemporary Christian life is such that God, if he ever existed, must surely be dead.”
As a teen, I joined a gang and became an arsonist and drug smuggler.
The experience you shared is serious and should be taken seriously. What happened to your friend was horrific, and I can understand why that would cause you to approach the question of evil as existentially urgent rather than merely academic. And your own later descent into gang life and crime only underscores that this was not, for you, a parlor room philosophical exercise.
Nevertheless, I would say none of that functions as an argument against God, but rather as an account of why the question became existentially urgent, which is totally fair—and totally autobiographical. Russell’s line, while rhetorically powerful, is logically weak. At most, it says that religious hypocrisy and human wickedness made unbelief feel more plausible to him. That is autobiography, not proof.
So you may be able to dismantle the “logic,” but not the “experiential reality” behind it.
True, those are different things. Dismantling the logic of an argument does not necessarily dissolve the experiential reality that gave rise to it.
But I would never claim otherwise. What happened to your friend, and the way that evil impressed itself upon you after that, is not nullified by a philosophical rebuttal. That being said, the intensity of the experience likewise doesn’t make the argument sound. While the existential weight is real, the inference still has to be justified.