Soul, Personhood, and Immortality: A Holistic Covenantal Anthropology

[John Bauer]

Disclaimer: This work is a personal theological synthesis and should not be understood as representing the formal doctrine of any church, denomination, confession, or theological tradition. While it engages and integrates ideas from multiple sources, it is offered solely as my own constructive articulation.
​

Soul, Personhood, and Immortality: A Holistic Covenantal Anthropology​

This model stands in continuity with the Hebraic “whole person” anthropology of scripture. In the Old Testament, nephesh (“soul”) and in the New Testament, psyche, refer not to a separable, immaterial component but to the whole living person in relation to God. Human beings are portrayed as embodied creatures whose life depends entirely on God’s sustaining breath (Gen 2:7; Ps 104:29). The biblical hope is resurrection in a renewed creation, not the persistence of an immortal essence apart from the body.

In this holistic covenantal anthropology, the Hebraic whole-person view is developed systematically through the integration of Lynne R. Baker’s constitution view, Herman Dooyeweerd’s concept of the enkaptic structural whole, G. C. Berkouwer’s covenantal anthropology, Anthony Hoekema’s psychosomatic unity, J. Richard Middleton’s eschatological telos of the imago Dei, and Edward Fudge’s doctrine of conditional immortality. This synthesis preserves the holistic anthropology of scripture while grounding human identity, continuity, and destiny in God’s covenant faithfulness rather than in an inherent immortal substance.

Introduction​

The soul is not a separable, immaterial substance distinct from the material body, a view that emerged from later theological developments influenced by Hellenistic categories. Biblically speaking, the soul is the person—the whole human person in covenantal relation to God. As a psychosomatic unity, the human soul is biologically constituted but defined theologically by vocational identity, covenantal accountability, and eschatological destiny. Scripture presents this holistic anthropology in terms of man being constituted as a covenant creature made in the image of God, thus man's self-consciousness is a covenant-consciousness.

And to be truly human is to be in Christ. Outside of him, personhood remains disoriented and broken—and terminal (as the wicked are said to perish entirely). Christ is not merely the solution to a fallen anthropology, he is its fulfillment, pattern, and telos from the beginning. He is not merely an exemplar of restored humanity; he is the eschatological archetype in whom true humanity is defined and reconstituted. Our glorification, then (Rom 8:30), is the full realization of personhood: perfected covenant consciousness, embodied in resurrection glory, fully restored to communion with God.

In this view—shaped by Baker, Berkouwer, Dooyeweerd, Hoekema, Middleton, and Fudge—the human person is a psychosomatic unity, a covenantal creature made in the image of God, constituted biologically but defined theologically by vocation, covenantal accountability, and eschatological destiny. True selfhood is not reducible to physical processes nor identifiable with an immaterial substance, but is centered in the religious heart—man's supra-modal direction before God. Personhood is historically embedded, narratively shaped, and eschatologically oriented toward resurrection life in union with Christ.

Anthropological Structure — What We Are:​

• Psychosomatic Unity (Hoekema)
  
  ​
  • From Anthony Hoekema comes the valuable affirmation of psychosomatic unity—that man is an integrated whole of body and soul, without dualistic partitioning.
    
    ​
  • In relation to the intermediate state, this view does not affirm conscious disembodied existence as a necessity for continuity, but rather sees the person as preserved in covenant by the faithfulness of God, awaiting resurrection.
    
    ​
  • Continuity is grounded in divine faithfulness, not metaphysical survival.
  ​
• Personhood as Constitution (Baker)
  
  ​
  • Following Lynne R. Baker, this view affirms that persons are constituted by, but not identical with, their bodies.
    
    ​
  • First-person perspective is seen not as autonomous self-awareness, but as covenantal self-consciousness: the creature's capacity to know, trust, and obey God.
    
    ​
  • Baker's insight, that personhood is not reducible to biology, is preserved while her secular framing is theologically reinterpreted.

Anthropological Orientation — Our Relation to God:​

• Man Before God (Berkouwer)
  
  ​
  • From G. C. Berkouwer comes the insistence that anthropology must be relational and covenantal, not metaphysical or speculative.
    
    ​
  • Terms like soul or spirit are treated as relational descriptors, not metaphysical parts.
    
    ​
  • The person is not a sum of components but stands as a whole in covenant before God.
  ​
• Religious Heart as Center (Dooyeweerd)
  
  ​
  • Drawing from Herman Dooyeweerd, the person's true identity lies in the heart—the religious center that transcends all modal functions.
    
    ​
  • The soul is not a substance nor an aspect, but the directionally oriented center of human life, grounded in the law-order of God.
    
    ​
  • Human dignity is rooted in the heart's relation to God, not in rational or psychological functions.

Anthropological Destiny — Our Eschatological End:​

• Creational and Eschatological Embodiment (Middleton)
  
  ​
  • J. Richard Middleton's emphasis on creational embodiment and resurrection hope is also key.
    
    ​
  • The human person is not meant to escape the body but to be glorified in the body, ruling and reflecting God in the new creation. Salvation is not soul-flight but the restoration of whole persons in a renewed creation.
    
    ​
  • The imago Dei is not a static attribute but a dynamic calling: To reflect God’s rule in creation, to live in communion with God, and to represent him as a vice-regent.
  ​
• Conditional Immortality (Fudge)
  
  ​
  • Informed by Edward W. Fudge, this view emphasizes that immortality is a salvific gift granted only to believers, wherein Christ brought life and immortality to light through the gospel. Man is not inherently immortal; God alone possesses immortality (1 Tim 6:16).
    
    ​
  • Those who remain spiritually separated from God will, in the end, be metaphysically separated from him. The human being subsists in metaphysical dependence on God, the self-existent and only source of all being. In the final judgment, the wicked are utterly cut off; that dependence is severed, and with it their very being.
    
    ​
  • This flows from Hoekema's psychosomatic unity, Baker's constitution view, Berkouwer's covenantal anthropology, the religious heart in Dooyeweerd's anthropology, and the glorification telos in Middleton’s theology of the imago Dei, such that the image of God is consummated in the fullness of resurrection life, Christocentric perfection, and eternal communion with God. In the eschaton, God will be all in all; those cut off from him perish entirely. Only in spiritual union with Christ is metaphysical union fully realized in glorification.

More on Dooyeweerd​

Dooyeweerd sees the human being as an "enkaptic structural whole," meaning a complex unity with multiple irreducible aspects. The term "enkaptic" comes from the Greek "enkapsis," which Dooyeweerd uses to describe a special kind of relationship between different individuality structures that are bound together in a meaningful whole without losing their distinct identities or characteristics—differing structures, interlaced or interwoven, forming a complex unity, while each structure retains its own internal integrity and unique character.

In Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, an enkaptic structural whole is not a simple part-whole relationship. Instead—and here it coincides with Baker's constitution view—the different individuality structures in the whole are “restrictively bound” together, meaning one depends on the other in some way for its meaning or existence, but without destroying the peculiar character of either structure. For example:

• A statue (an aesthetic individuality structure) is enkaptically bound to the marble (a physical individuality structure) from which it is formed. This illustrates Dooyeweerd’s enkaptic structural whole—and, in Baker’s terms, a constitution relation, which is one kind of enkaptic relation. The marble and the statue are so enkaptically bound as to constitute a singular whole; this enkaptic constitution means the marble remains marble even though it constitutes (is part of) the statue, while the statue as a whole is more than just the marble because the sculptor has given it form and meaning, making it the kind of thing it is.
  
  ​
• In the same way, the human person (a covenantal–vocational individuality structure) is so enkaptically bound to the body (a physical–biological individuality structure) as to constitute a singular whole, a psychosomatic unity. The body remains a body even though it constitutes the person, while the person as a whole is more than just the body because God has endowed it with a first-person perspective (Baker), a covenantal identity and accountability before him (Berkouwer), an oriented religious heart (Dooyeweerd), and a destiny unto glorification in Christ (Middleton). This enkaptic constitution, defined covenantally, means that life endures only within the bond sustained by the self-existent God (Hoekema), and apart from that bond it ceases altogether (Fudge).

When Dooyeweerd calls the human being an "enkaptic structural whole," he means that a human is a complex unity composed of multiple irreducible individuality structures (such as biological, psychological, cultural, and spiritual aspects) woven together in such a way that each aspect remains distinct yet intrinsically connected to the others in the person’s existence. This avoids reductive dualism or mechanistic reduction, showing the deep interconnectedness of body, soul, and spirit, as well as the multifaceted dimensions of human experience that operate simultaneously and meaningfully.

In summary:

• Enkaptic = interwoven, interlaced binding of diverse individuality structures in a whole.
• The whole and its parts retain distinct identities and internal principles.
• The relation is one of constitutive interdependence, in which each structure contributes to the meaningful unity of the whole while retaining its own integrity and distinctive properties.
• Human beings, for Dooyeweerd, are enkaptic wholes made up of many irreducible but integrated modal aspects.

This concept is important for understanding his philosophical anthropology and broader metaphysics, giving a holistic and integrated picture of reality grounded in his modal theory and the sovereignty of God over all aspects of existence.

---

Addendum​

Immortality is covenantal continuity, not ontological continuity. Out of the preceding integrated framework flows the idea that human beings don't inherently possess immortality by virtue of an enduring ontological essence. Life is sustained only within a covenantal bond with the self-existent God, and apart from that bond it ceases altogether.

 

[makesends]

​

Disclaimer: This work is a personal theological synthesis and should not be understood as representing the formal doctrine of any church, denomination, confession, or theological tradition. While it engages and integrates ideas from multiple sources, it is offered solely as my own constructive articulation.​

I'm not sure what you are articulating, here —your own view as a result of, or expressed as, a synthesis of the several views you describe? Or, rather, just a "book report" style short description of each view? I'm not sure I see a final description/ conclusion.

​

Soul, Personhood, and Immortality: A Holistic Covenantal Anthropology​

This model stands in continuity with the Hebraic “whole person” anthropology of scripture. In the Old Testament, nephesh (“soul”) and in the New Testament, psyche, refer not to a separable, immaterial component but to the whole living person in relation to God. Human beings are portrayed as embodied creatures whose life depends entirely on God’s sustaining breath (Gen 2:7; Ps 104:29). The biblical hope is resurrection in a renewed creation, not the persistence of an immortal essence apart from the body.

In this holistic covenantal anthropology, the Hebraic whole-person view is developed systematically through the integration of Lynne R. Baker’s constitution view, Herman Dooyeweerd’s concept of the enkaptic structural whole, G. C. Berkouwer’s covenantal anthropology, Anthony Hoekema’s psychosomatic unity, J. Richard Middleton’s eschatological telos of the imago Dei, and Edward Fudge’s doctrine of conditional immortality. This synthesis preserves the holistic anthropology of scripture while grounding human identity, continuity, and destiny in God’s covenant faithfulness rather than in an inherent immortal substance.

Introduction​

The soul is not a separable, immaterial substance distinct from the material body, a view that emerged from later theological developments influenced by Hellenistic categories. Biblically speaking, the soul is the person—the whole human person in covenantal relation to God. As a psychosomatic unity, the human soul is biologically constituted but defined theologically by vocational identity, covenantal accountability, and eschatological destiny. Scripture presents this holistic anthropology in terms of man being constituted as a covenant creature made in the image of God, thus man's self-consciousness is a covenant-consciousness.

And to be truly human is to be in Christ. Outside of him, personhood remains disoriented and broken—and terminal (as the wicked are said to perish entirely). Christ is not merely the solution to a fallen anthropology, he is its fulfillment, pattern, and telos from the beginning. He is not merely an exemplar of restored humanity; he is the eschatological archetype in whom true humanity is defined and reconstituted. Our glorification, then (Rom 8:30), is the full realization of personhood: perfected covenant consciousness, embodied in resurrection glory, fully restored to communion with God.

In this view—shaped by Baker, Berkouwer, Dooyeweerd, Hoekema, Middleton, and Fudge—the human person is a psychosomatic unity, a covenantal creature made in the image of God, constituted biologically but defined theologically by vocation, covenantal accountability, and eschatological destiny. True selfhood is not reducible to physical processes nor identifiable with an immaterial substance, but is centered in the religious heart—man's supra-modal direction before God. Personhood is historically embedded, narratively shaped, and eschatologically oriented toward resurrection life in union with Christ.

Anthropological Structure — What We Are:​

• Psychosomatic Unity (Hoekema)
  
  ​
  • From Anthony Hoekema comes the valuable affirmation of psychosomatic unity—that man is an integrated whole of body and soul, without dualistic partitioning.
    
    ​
  • In relation to the intermediate state, this view does not affirm conscious disembodied existence as a necessity for continuity, but rather sees the person as preserved in covenant by the faithfulness of God, awaiting resurrection.
    
    ​
  • Continuity is grounded in divine faithfulness, not metaphysical survival.
• Personhood as Constitution (Baker)
  
  ​
  • Following Lynne R. Baker, this view affirms that persons are constituted by, but not identical with, their bodies.
    
    ​
  • First-person perspective is seen not as autonomous self-awareness, but as covenantal self-consciousness: the creature's capacity to know, trust, and obey God.
    
    ​
  • Baker's insight, that personhood is not reducible to biology, is preserved while her secular framing is theologically reinterpreted.

Anthropological Orientation — Our Relation to God:​

• Man Before God (Berkouwer)
  
  ​
  • From G. C. Berkouwer comes the insistence that anthropology must be relational and covenantal, not metaphysical or speculative.
    
    ​
  • Terms like soul or spirit are treated as relational descriptors, not metaphysical parts.
    
    ​
  • The person is not a sum of components but stands as a whole in covenant before God.
• Religious Heart as Center (Dooyeweerd)
  
  ​
  • Drawing from Herman Dooyeweerd, the person's true identity lies in the heart—the religious center that transcends all modal functions.
    
    ​

Several places throughout, I'm not sure of what is being said, because of certain terms lacking explanation —for example, Dooyeweerd's use of the term, "law-order of God." I can only guess he means something like what we might call, God's say-so, or God's Decree. But I understand it is necessary to keep it brief.

• • The soul is not a substance nor an aspect, but the directionally oriented center of human life, grounded in the law-order of God.
    
    ​
  • Human dignity is rooted in the heart's relation to God, not in rational or psychological functions.

So much of this rings true with me, above and below this comment, philosophically consistent with the fact of God being the very source and sustenance of existence, and theologically consistent with God's utter sovereignty and the power or drive of his purpose in creating. You've probably heard me say that the best self-esteem comes from knowing that I am only ever whatever God's purpose is for me, and what he sees 'as me'.

Anthropological Destiny — Our Eschatological End:​

• Creational and Eschatological Embodiment (Middleton)
  
  ​
  • J. Richard Middleton's emphasis on creational embodiment and resurrection hope is also key.
    
    ​
  • The human person is not meant to escape the body but to be glorified in the body, ruling and reflecting God in the new creation. Salvation is not soul-flight but the restoration of whole persons in a renewed creation.
    
    ​
  • The imago Dei is not a static attribute but a dynamic calling: To reflect God’s rule in creation, to live in communion with God, and to represent him as a vice-regent.
• Conditional Immortality (Fudge)
  
  ​
  • Informed by Edward W. Fudge, this view emphasizes that immortality is a salvific gift granted only to believers, wherein Christ brought life and immortality to light through the gospel. Man is not inherently immortal; God alone possesses immortality (1 Tim 6:16).
    
    ​
  • Those who remain spiritually separated from God will, in the end, be metaphysically separated from him. The human being subsists in metaphysical dependence on God, the self-existent and only source of all being. In the final judgment, the wicked are utterly cut off; that dependence is severed, and with it their very being.
    
    ​
  • This flows from Hoekema's psychosomatic unity, Baker's constitution view, Berkouwer's covenantal anthropology, the religious heart in Dooyeweerd's anthropology, and the glorification telos in Middleton’s theology of the imago Dei, such that the image of God is consummated in the fullness of resurrection life, Christocentric perfection, and eternal communion with God. In the eschaton, God will be all in all; those cut off from him perish entirely. Only in spiritual union with Christ is metaphysical union fully realized in glorification.

More on Dooyeweerd​

Dooyeweerd sees the human being as an "enkaptic structural whole," meaning a complex unity with multiple irreducible aspects. The term "enkaptic" comes from the Greek "enkapsis," which Dooyeweerd uses to describe a special kind of relationship between different individuality structures that are bound together in a meaningful whole without losing their distinct identities or characteristics—differing structures, interlaced or interwoven, forming a complex unity, while each structure retains its own internal integrity and unique character.

In Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, an enkaptic structural whole is not a simple part-whole relationship. Instead—and here it coincides with Baker's constitution view—the different individuality structures in the whole are “restrictively bound” together, meaning one depends on the other in some way for its meaning or existence, but without destroying the peculiar character of either structure. For example:

• A statue (an aesthetic individuality structure) is enkaptically bound to the marble (a physical individuality structure) from which it is formed. This illustrates Dooyeweerd’s enkaptic structural whole—and, in Baker’s terms, a constitution relation, which is one kind of enkaptic relation. The marble and the statue are so enkaptically bound as to constitute a singular whole; this enkaptic constitution means the marble remains marble even though it constitutes (is part of) the statue, while the statue as a whole is more than just the marble because the sculptor has given it form and meaning, making it the kind of thing it is.
  
  ​
• In the same way, the human person (a covenantal–vocational individuality structure) is so enkaptically bound to the body (a physical–biological individuality structure) as to constitute a singular whole, a psychosomatic unity. The body remains a body even though it constitutes the person, while the person as a whole is more than just the body because God has endowed it with a first-person perspective (Baker), a covenantal identity and accountability before him (Berkouwer), an oriented religious heart (Dooyeweerd), and a destiny unto glorification in Christ (Middleton). This enkaptic constitution, defined covenantally, means that life endures only within the bond sustained by the self-existent God (Hoekema), and apart from that bond it ceases altogether (Fudge).

When Dooyeweerd calls the human being an "enkaptic structural whole," he means that a human is a complex unity composed of multiple irreducible individuality structures (such as biological, psychological, cultural, and spiritual aspects) woven together in such a way that each aspect remains distinct yet intrinsically connected to the others in the person’s existence. This avoids reductive dualism or mechanistic reduction, showing the deep interconnectedness of body, soul, and spirit, as well as the multifaceted dimensions of human experience that operate simultaneously and meaningfully.

In summary:

• Enkaptic = interwoven, interlaced binding of diverse individuality structures in a whole.
• The whole and its parts retain distinct identities and internal principles.
• The relation is one of constitutive interdependence, in which each structure contributes to the meaningful unity of the whole while retaining its own integrity and distinctive properties.
• Human beings, for Dooyeweerd, are enkaptic wholes made up of many irreducible but integrated modal aspects.

This concept is important for understanding his philosophical anthropology and broader metaphysics, giving a holistic and integrated picture of reality grounded in his modal theory and the sovereignty of God over all aspects of existence.

Not that this at all denies what Scripture presents as a 'putting-off' of this body, which it calls this 'tent', and being clothed, but I mention it as a kind of antithesis for the sake of perspective.

---

Addendum​

Immortality is covenantal continuity, not ontological continuity. Out of the preceding integrated framework flows the idea that human beings don't inherently possess immortality by virtue of an enduring ontological essence. Life is sustained only within a covenantal bond with the self-existent God, and apart from that bond it ceases altogether.

I think I completely agree with this, except that your conclusion seems to me to fall short of what you have so far presented as our very ontology being God's work (my words). It falls short in that you suppose the ceasing to be a necessary logical conclusion to God abandoning them altogether. I think that jumps a few logical steps.

And there, I don't mean to say that they continue to exist—not at all. I'm saying that the terminology you use is necessarily time-passage assuming, or assumes a necessary sequence of events / states. In this matter is touched the mystery of just what life is, and what death is (particularly the "second death"). What you describe as a ceasing, I find myself compelled to describe as mere fact. THAT is what they are. Already, but not yet.

This is partly why I think the what the Bible describes as what WE take to mean one suffers in hell for an infinite time, I prefer to think of as merely fact—intensity of experience, perhaps. Neither with beginning nor with ending, but simply, what it is to be abandoned by God.

And conversely, what we are when glorified. In this sense, I say, neither the born-again, nor the reprobate, are yet complete persons. One way I think of it is that we will be utterly changed, and they will be utterly abandoned. That is who God created.

Forgive my inability to be clear. Ha! and yes, in part because it is not a complete thought.

 

[John Bauer]

I'm not sure what you are articulating, here—your own ... synthesis of the several views you describe? Or, rather, just a "book report" style short description of each view?

The former, as I tried to state clearly in the disclaimer—"This work is a personal theological synthesis"—wherein "personal" meant my own.

And it should be evident in the post itself. For example, it is Baker's thesis that persons are constituted by, but not identical with, their bodies. Building on that, I said this first-person perspective is not an autonomous self-awareness but a covenantal self-consciousness, articulated as the creature's capacity to know, trust, and obey God. And I made sure to add, "Baker's insight, that personhood is not reducible to biology, is preserved while her secular framing is theologically reinterpreted" (emphasis added).

If I was sharing a kind of "book report" of these different views, I would have called it a theological overview, not a synthesis.

Several places throughout, I'm not sure of what is being said, because of certain terms lacking explanation —for example, Dooyeweerd's use of the term, "law-order of God." I can only guess he means something like what we might call God's say-so, or God's decree. But I understand it is necessary to keep it brief.

Indeed, the intent was to keep it brief and to the point, knowing that any clarifications that might be needed could be added later upon request.

Like this, here. What did Dooyeweerd mean by the term "law-order of God"? For him—and for me to a large extent—all of created reality is structured and ordered by God through his law. This "law-order" is not just moral law but the totality of laws governing every aspect of creation—physical, logical, ethical, juridical, and so forth. And he ties this not only to structure but also to direction. Structurally, creation is good and ordered under God's law. Directionally, the human heart—the religious center of existence—can either live in obedience (directed toward God) or in apostasy (directed toward idols).

Thus, the law-order of God sets the boundaries and meaning of human life but requires covenantal orientation of the heart to be lived rightly.

So much of this rings true with me, above and below this comment, philosophically consistent with the fact of God being the very source and sustenance of existence, and theologically consistent with God's utter sovereignty and the power or drive of his purpose in creating. You've probably heard me say that the best self-esteem comes from knowing that I am only ever whatever God's purpose is for me, and what he sees 'as me'.

Where would you offer some pushback? Anywhere? I put these ideas out there in order to subject them to biblical and theological scrutiny. (But it's fine if you have none to offer.)

I think I completely agree with this, except that your conclusion seems to me to fall short of what you have so far presented as our very ontology being God's work (my words). It falls short in that you suppose the ceasing to be a necessary logical conclusion to God abandoning them altogether. I think that jumps a few logical steps.

And there, I don't mean to say that they continue to exist—not at all. I'm saying that the terminology you use is necessarily time-passage assuming, or assumes a necessary sequence of events / states. In this matter is touched the mystery of just what life is, and what death is (particularly the "second death"). What you describe as a ceasing, I find myself compelled to describe as mere fact. That is what they are. Already, but not yet.

This is partly why I think the what the Bible describes as what we take to mean one suffers in hell for an infinite time, I prefer to think of as merely fact—intensity of experience, perhaps. Neither with beginning nor with ending, but simply, what it is to be abandoned by God.

And conversely, what we are when glorified. In this sense, I say, neither the born-again, nor the reprobate, are yet complete persons. One way I think of it is that we will be utterly changed, and they will be utterly abandoned. That is who God created.

Forgive my inability to be clear. Ha! and yes, in part because it is not a complete thought.

I am having a really hard time understanding what you're saying here. You say my view jumps a few logical steps—but where?

Maybe you misunderstand my view. I don't know. You wrote that I "suppose the ceasing to be a necessary logical conclusion to God abandoning them altogether." But in this view there is no sequence, moment, or intermediate step between (a) cut off metaphysically from God and (b) non-being. "In him we live and move and have our being," scripture says (Acts 17:28), so to be cut off metaphysically from God is immediate non-being. It is not eventual, not even a fractional second.

On the matter of temporal language ("the terminology you use is necessarily time-passage assuming"), this is where I'm really puzzled by your critique. Any human language we use is tensed. Even scripture itself is saturated with temporal categories from Genesis to Revelation, and God clearly deemed such language adequate for revealing eternal truth—not only in scripture but even in the divine Son becoming a temporal human being and using temporal language. So, to fault the use of temporal language seems misguided, perhaps even unfair.

 

[makesends]

The former, as I tried to state clearly in the disclaimer—"This work is a personal theological synthesis"—wherein "personal" meant my own.

And it should be evident in the post itself. For example, it is Baker's thesis that persons are constituted by, but not identical with, their bodies. Building on that, I said this first-person perspective is not an autonomous self-awareness but a covenantal self-consciousness, articulated as the creature's capacity to know, trust, and obey God. And I made sure to add, "Baker's insight, that personhood is not reducible to biology, is preserved while her secular framing is theologically reinterpreted" (emphasis added).

If I was sharing a kind of "book report" of these different views, I would have called it a theological overview, not a synthesis.

I understand that, but I'm saying that what little I found as your synthesis, in the end, was more of a sketch than a well-developed, or thorough, description of what you believe. But, no big deal: I understand the need to keep it brief.

Indeed, the intent was to keep it brief and to the point, knowing that any clarifications that might be needed could be added later upon request.

Like this, here. What did Dooyeweerd mean by the term "law-order of God"? For him—and for me to a large extent—all of created reality is structured and ordered by God through his law. This "law-order" is not just moral law but the totality of laws governing every aspect of creation—physical, logical, ethical, juridical, and so forth. And he ties this not only to structure but also to direction. Structurally, creation is good and ordered under God's law. Directionally, the human heart—the religious center of existence—can either live in obedience (directed toward God) or in apostasy (directed toward idols).

Thus, the law-order of God sets the boundaries and meaning of human life but requires covenantal orientation of the heart to be lived rightly.

Ok. Thanks for that explanation.

makesends said:
So much of this rings true with me, above and below this comment, philosophically consistent with the fact of God being the very source and sustenance of existence, and theologically consistent with God's utter sovereignty and the power or drive of his purpose in creating. You've probably heard me say that the best self-esteem comes from knowing that I am only ever whatever God's purpose is for me, and what he sees 'as me'.

Where would you offer some pushback? Anywhere? I put these ideas out there in order to subject them to biblical and theological scrutiny. (But it's fine if you have none to offer.)

makesends said:
I think I completely agree with this, except that your conclusion seems to me to fall short of what you have so far presented as our very ontology being God's work (my words). It falls short in that you suppose the ceasing to be a necessary logical conclusion to God abandoning them altogether. I think that jumps a few logical steps.

And there, I don't mean to say that they continue to exist—not at all. I'm saying that the terminology you use is necessarily time-passage assuming, or assumes a necessary sequence of events / states. In this matter is touched the mystery of just what life is, and what death is (particularly the "second death"). What you describe as a ceasing, I find myself compelled to describe as mere fact. That is what they are. Already, but not yet.

This is partly why I think the what the Bible describes as what we take to mean one suffers in hell for an infinite time, I prefer to think of as merely fact—intensity of experience, perhaps. Neither with beginning nor with ending, but simply, what it is to be abandoned by God.

And conversely, what we are when glorified. In this sense, I say, neither the born-again, nor the reprobate, are yet complete persons. One way I think of it is that we will be utterly changed, and they will be utterly abandoned. That is who God created.

I am having a really hard time understanding what you're saying here. You say my view jumps a few logical steps—but where?

Maybe you misunderstand my view. I don't know. You wrote that I "suppose the ceasing to be a necessary logical conclusion to God abandoning them altogether." But in this view there is no sequence, moment, or intermediate step between (a) cut off metaphysically from God and (b) non-being. "In him we live and move and have our being," scripture says (Acts 17:28), so to be cut off metaphysically from God is immediate non-being. It is not eventual, not even a fractional second.

On the matter of temporal language ("the terminology you use is necessarily time-passage assuming"), this is where I'm really puzzled by your critique. Any human language we use is tensed. Even scripture itself is saturated with temporal categories from Genesis to Revelation, and God clearly deemed such language adequate for revealing eternal truth—not only in scripture but even in the divine Son becoming a temporal human being and using temporal language. So, to fault the use of temporal language seems misguided, perhaps even unfair.

I admit that I most likely overstate my point in order to show the difference I'm trying to get across. And I happily admit that what happens in this temporal frame really does happen, and in sequence, (though I doubt that our view (that causal sequence is necessarily time sequence and vice versa) is valid). I can't say for sure where God's temporal references and God's use of our language to convey eternal truth is anthropomorphically done and where not.

The logical steps I think are being jumped have to do with the search for "what happens" as opposed to "who are they", or better, "who/what is God, and so what are the reprobate. The position of Annihilationism draws a conclusion that the reprobate "cease to exist", which to me necessarily implies that at some POINT IN TIME they stop existing. 1) Time being relative, I find that idea problematic. If valid, it seems to me, it would imply that it is only a point of view thing--from another position they are maybe still alive, from another long dead from the beginning? I don't know... I just don't think it is that simple to say, if time is a valid benchmark. 2) If, on the other hand, the reprobate are [at least clinically] not chosen for and not intended for salvation, to God they are only what they are, tools and otherwise, refuse. He does have that right, as owner of his creation. They never were more, except as whatever good God does by them. When he has removed himself, they are at the most wraiths. But to put it that way is misleading. I tend to think of it as THAT (whatever God had for them) is all they ever were, though we loved what we saw. What we saw was not what they are, to God, who is the ONLY one who knows the truth of who they are.

Thus, to me, I am left with no reference to time in what 'happens to them', but only the intensity of God's no-longer having anything to do with them. Admittedly, there are a lot of other things that I also tend to think are valid thoughts, that at least on the surface contradict some of that, and I have not developed any of it enough to sort that out. But Annihilationism (as I understand it) doesn't answer those questions for me either.

But I see I've wandered afield of the title of the OP, though that is where your post goes as a matter of course, though the title does not. The covenant of God concerns his own, and not the reprobate. I don't see where Annihilationism is a valid doctrine, though, if one must depend on a point at which all unbelievers are potentially elect, and then upon a 'later' point in which they are found to be reprobate, ok, if it gives them comfort to say they cease to be. Myself, I don't know what existence IS, well enough to say they cease to be.

Anyhow, thanks for listening.

 

[Hobie]

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Disclaimer: This work is a personal theological synthesis and should not be understood as representing the formal doctrine of any church, denomination, confession, or theological tradition. While it engages and integrates ideas from multiple sources, it is offered solely as my own constructive articulation.​

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Soul, Personhood, and Immortality: A Holistic Covenantal Anthropology​

This model stands in continuity with the Hebraic “whole person” anthropology of scripture. In the Old Testament, nephesh (“soul”) and in the New Testament, psyche, refer not to a separable, immaterial component but to the whole living person in relation to God. Human beings are portrayed as embodied creatures whose life depends entirely on God’s sustaining breath (Gen 2:7; Ps 104:29). The biblical hope is resurrection in a renewed creation, not the persistence of an immortal essence apart from the body.

In this holistic covenantal anthropology, the Hebraic whole-person view is developed systematically through the integration of Lynne R. Baker’s constitution view, Herman Dooyeweerd’s concept of the enkaptic structural whole, G. C. Berkouwer’s covenantal anthropology, Anthony Hoekema’s psychosomatic unity, J. Richard Middleton’s eschatological telos of the imago Dei, and Edward Fudge’s doctrine of conditional immortality. This synthesis preserves the holistic anthropology of scripture while grounding human identity, continuity, and destiny in God’s covenant faithfulness rather than in an inherent immortal substance.

Introduction​

The soul is not a separable, immaterial substance distinct from the material body, a view that emerged from later theological developments influenced by Hellenistic categories. Biblically speaking, the soul is the person—the whole human person in covenantal relation to God. As a psychosomatic unity, the human soul is biologically constituted but defined theologically by vocational identity, covenantal accountability, and eschatological destiny. Scripture presents this holistic anthropology in terms of man being constituted as a covenant creature made in the image of God, thus man's self-consciousness is a covenant-consciousness....

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Addendum​

Immortality is covenantal continuity, not ontological continuity. Out of the preceding integrated framework flows the idea that human beings don't inherently possess immortality by virtue of an enduring ontological essence. Life is sustained only within a covenantal bond with the self-existent God, and apart from that bond it ceases altogether.

If I may, what are your thoughts on how you see this of this study on the section on the soul...

Body, Soul, Spirit

Man, like all beings endowed with life, originated from two elements,—namely, from earthly material (עָפָר, אֲדָמָה), and from the Divine Spirit (רוּחַ), Gen. 2:7, comp. Ps. 104:29 f., 146:4. As in general נֶפֶשׁ, soul, originates in the בָּשָׂר, the flesh, by the union of spirit with matter, so in particular the human soul arises in the human body by the breathing of the divine breath (נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים) into the material frame of the human body. But although the life-spring of the רוּחַ, from which the soul arises, is common to man and beast, both do not originate from it in the same way. The souls of animals arise, like plants from the earth, as a consequence of the divine word of power, Gen. 1:24 (תּוֹצֵא הָאָרֶץ נֶפֶשׁ). Thus the creating spirit which entered in the beginning, 1:2, into matter, rules in them; their connection with the divine spring of life is through the medium of the common terrestrial creation. But the human soul does not spring from the earth; it is created by a special act of divine inbreathing; see 2:7 in connection with 1:26. The human body was formed from the earth before the soul; in it, therefore, those powers operate which are inherent to matter apart from the soul (a proposition which is of great importance, as Delitzsch rightly remarks). But the human body is still not an animated body; the powers existing in the material frame are not yet comprehended into a unity of life; the breath of life is communicated to this frame directly from God, and so the living man originates. According to the view of many, the specific difference between the life of the human soul and that of animals is expressed by the use of the term נְשָׁמָה in 2:7 (2). This, however, cannot be established, for in 7:22 ("All in whose nostrils was the breath of life died"), the exclusive reference of the expression נְשָׁמָה to man (as merely another expression for כֹּל הָאָדָם, ver. 21), coming between the general terms comprehending man and beast, which stand both before and after it, is not natural. In Deut. 20:16, Josh. 10:40, 11:11–14, כָּל־נְשָׁמָה denotes only men; but in these passages the special reference of the expression is made clear by the connection,—in the passage in Deuteronomy by ver. 18, and in the book of Joshua because from 8:2 onward the cattle are excepted from the חֵרֶם. Otherwise one might as well prove from Josh. 11:11, where כָּל־הַנֶּפֶשׁ is used exclusively of man, that the human soul alone is called נֶפֶשׁ. But it is correct that in the other places in the Old Testament in which נְשָׁמָה occurs it is never expressly used of the mere animal principle of life; p 150 comp. Isa. 42:5, Prov. 20:27, Job 32:8, and Ps. 150:6 (כֹּל הַנְּשָׁמָה). Thus the substance of the human soul is the divine spirit of life uniting itself with matter; the spirit is not merely the cause by reason of which the נֶפֶש contained beforehand in the body becomes living, as Gen. 2:7 has by some been understood (3). For in the עָפָר as such, in the structure of dust, there is, according to the Old Testament, as yet no נֶפֶשׁ, even latently. This is first in the בָּשָׂר, in the flesh; but the earthly materials do not become flesh until the רוּחַ has become united with it, 6:17, 7:15, Job 12:10, 34:14 f. It is no proof against this (as has further been objected) that in some passages (Lev. 21:11; Num. 6:6), the dead body from which, according to Gen. 35:18, the soul has departed, is called נֶפֶשׁ מֵת before it crumbles to dust. I believe this expression is to be understood as a euphemistic metonymy, just as we speak of a dead person without meaning to say that the personality lies in the body; or perhaps in this designation of a dead person the impression is expressed which the corpse makes immediately after death, as if the element of the soul had not yet entirely separated itself (thus Delitzsch) (4). But as the soul sprang from the spirit, the רוּחַ, and contains the substance of the spirit as the basis of its existence, the soul exists and lives also only by the power of the רוּחַ; in order to live, the soul which is called into existence must remain in connection with the source of its life. "God's spirit made me" (רוּחַ אֵל עָשָׂ֑תְנִי), says Job. 33:4, "and the breath of the Almighty animates me" (וְנִשְׁמַת שַׁדַּי תְחַיֵנִי, with the imperfect). The first sentence expresses the way in which the human soul is called into being; the second, the continuing condition of its subsistence. By the withdrawing of the רוּחַ the soul becomes wearied and weak, till at last in death it becomes a shadow, and enters the kingdom of the dead (comp. § 78); while by the רוּחַ streaming in, it receives vital energy. With this explanation the Old Testament usage in connection with the terms נֶפֶשׁ and רוּחַ becomes intelligible. In the soul, which sprang from the spirit, and exists continually through it, lies the individuality,—in the case of man his personality, his self, his ego; because man is not רוּחַ, but has it—he is soul. Hence only נַפְשִׁי, נַפְשְׁךָ, can stand for egomet ipse, tu ipse, etc., not רוּחִי, רוּחֲךָ, etc. (not so in Arabic); hence "soul" often stands for the whole person, Gen. 12:5, 17:14, Ezek. 18:4, etc. When man is exhausted by illness, his רוּחַ is corrupted within him, Job 17:1 (רוּחִי חֻבָּלָה), so that the soul still continues to vegetate wearily. When a person in a swoon comes to himself again, it is said his spirit returns to him, 1 Sam. 30:12 (וַתָּֽשָׁב נֶפֶשׁ) compared with Judg. 15:19. But when one dies, it is said the soul departs, Gen. 35:18; his soul is taken from him, 1 Kings 19:4, Jonah 4:3. When a dead person becomes alive again, is is said the soul returns again, 1 Kings 17:22 (וַתָּֽשָׁב נֶפֶשׁ). It is said of Jacob, whose sunken vital energy revived when he found his son again, that his spirit was quickened, Gen. 45:27 (וַתְּחִי רוּחַ). On the contrary, of one who is preserved in life it is said, חָיְתָה נֶפֶשׁ, [the soul lives] Jer. 38:17–20. When God rescues one from the jaws of death, it is said, Ps. 30:4, "Thou hast brought up my soul out of Sheol;" comp. Ps. 16:10 (5).—Man perceives and thinks by virtue of the spirit which animates him (Job 32:8; Prov. 20:27); wherefore it is said in 1 Kings 10:5, when the Queen of Sheba's comprehension was brought to a stand, that "there was no spirit in her more" (לֹא־הָיָה בָהּ עוֹד רוּחַ); but the p 151 perceiving and thinking subject itself is the נֶפֶש (comp. § 71). The impulse to act proceeds from the רוּחִ, Ex. 35:21; hence one who rules himself is a משֵׁל בְּרוּחוֹ, Prov. 16:32. But the acting subject is not the רוּחַ, but the נֶפֶשׁ; the soul is the subject which sins, Ezek. 18:4, etc. Love and attachment are of course a thing of the soul, Gen. 34:3 (וִתִּדְבַּק נַפְשׁוֹ) and ver. 8 (חָשְׁקָה נַפְשׁוֹ); and so in Cant. 5:6, the words of the beloved, נַפְשִׁי יָצְאָה, cannot be explained, "I was out of my senses" (as De Wette thinks), but the bride feels as if her very personality had gone forth from her to follow and seek her beloved. In many cases, indeed, נֶפֶשׁ and רוּחַ stand indifferently, according as the matter is looked upon—that is, to use Hofmann's words (Schriftbeweis, i. p. 296), according as "the personality is named after its special individual life, or after the living power which forms the condition of its special character." Thus it may be said on the one hand, "Why is thy spirit so stubborn?" (מַה־זֶּה רוּחֲךָ סָרָה), 1 Kings 21:5; on the other hand, "Why are thou so bowed down, O my soul?" (מַה־תּשְׁתּוחֲחִי נַפְשׁי), Ps. 42:12. Of impatience it may be said, "The soul is short" (וַתִּקְצַר נֶפֶשׁ), Num. 21:4, and "shortness of the spirit" (קֹצֶר רוּחַ), Ex. 6:9; compare Job 21:4. Trouble of heart is "bitterness of the spirit" (מֹרַת רוּחַ), Gen. 26:35; and of the soul (הֵמַר נַפְשִׁי), Job 27:2, it is said וַתּפָֽעֶם רוּחוֹ, Gen. 41:8, and נַפְשִׁי נִבְהֲלָה מְאֹד, Ps. 6:4. Compare with this in particular the climax in Isa. 26:9 (6). From all this it is clear that the Old Testament does not teach a trichotomy of the human being in the sense of body, soul, and spirit, as being originally three co-ordinate elements of man; rather the whole man is included in the בָּשָׂר and נֶפֶשׁ (body and soul), which spring from the union of the רוּחַ with matter, Ps. 84:3, Isa. 10:18; comp. Ps. 16:9. The רוּחַ forms in part the substance of the soul individualized in it, and in part, after the soul is established, the power and endowments which flow into it and can be withdrawn from it (7), (8)...Oehler, G. F., & Day, G. E. (1883). Theology of the Old Testament (pp. 149–152). Funk & Wagnalls.

 

[John Bauer]

If I may, what are your thoughts on [Oehler's view of the human soul]?

Well, I sure do have a warm spot in my heart for Lutherans. And any opponent of Schleiermacher is a friend of mine. You were quoting Gustav Friedrich Oehler, a 19th-century Lutheran theologian in Germany—although it wasn't "Germany" until 1871, a year before his death. He lived most of his life in the Kingdom of Württemberg.

Anyway.

There are differences between his view and mine, but they are relatively few. He believed that a human being is a unitary soul-in-body, which on closer inspection looks more like a quasi-dualism than a psychosomatic unity (e.g., he speaks of the soul departing the body). In my covenantal anthropology, taking after Berkouwer, nephesh and ruach do not map onto Platonic or Greek categories; they are not distinct ontological parts of man but different ways of describing the whole person in relation to God.

I do agree with Oehler quite strongly on one major point, though, which is that the Old Testament doesn't teach a trichotomy of the human being, wherein body, soul, and spirit are three coordinate elements of man. But, as I said, he is still a quasi-dualist, which means I push further than he does, landing on a Berkouwerian holistic monism (psychosomatic unity)—which I think makes better sense of those passages he cites than his view does.

I also agree with him that "the soul exists and lives" only by remaining "in connection with the source of its life"—although, for me, the "soul" is not some immaterial part of man that survives the body, but rather is basically a synonym for "person." When that connection is severed, which is a metaphysical separation from God, the soul is no more. Again, spiritual separation is the first death, and metaphysical separation is the second death. What Oehler described has resonance with my definition of the second death.

He also seems to believe that only Adam was made of dust by God, while everyone else exists by ordinary generation (in the womb). I would disagree with him there. For one thing, scripture says that animals were likewise "formed out of the ground" (Gen. 2:19). For another thing, all mankind is made of dust by God (Ps. 103:14; Job 10:9; 1 Cor. 15:48). So, everyone is dust-animated-by-God, not just Adam.

 

[Hobie]

Well, I sure do have a warm spot in my heart for Lutherans. And any opponent of Schleiermacher is a friend of mine. You were quoting Gustav Friedrich Oehler, a 19th-century Lutheran theologian in Germany—although it wasn't "Germany" until 1871, a year before his death. He lived most of his life in the Kingdom of Württemberg.

Anyway.

There are differences between his view and mine, but they are relatively few. He believed that a human being is a unitary soul-in-body, which on closer inspection looks more like a quasi-dualism than a psychosomatic unity (e.g., he speaks of the soul departing the body). In my covenantal anthropology, taking after Berkouwer, nephesh and ruach do not map onto Platonic or Greek categories; they are not distinct ontological parts of man but different ways of describing the whole person in relation to God.

I do agree with Oehler quite strongly on one major point, though, which is that the Old Testament doesn't teach a trichotomy of the human being, wherein body, soul, and spirit are three coordinate elements of man. But, as I said, he is still a quasi-dualist, which means I push further than he does, landing on a Berkouwerian holistic monism (psychosomatic unity)—which I think makes better sense of those passages he cites than his view does.

I also agree with him that "the soul exists and lives" only by remaining "in connection with the source of its life"—although, for me, the "soul" is not some immaterial part of man that survives the body, but rather is basically a synonym for "person." When that connection is severed, which is a metaphysical separation from God, the soul is no more. Again, spiritual separation is the first death, and metaphysical separation is the second death. What Oehler described has resonance with my definition of the second death.

He also seems to believe that only Adam was made of dust by God, while everyone else exists by ordinary generation (in the womb). I would disagree with him there. For one thing, scripture says that animals were likewise "formed out of the ground" (Gen. 2:19). For another thing, all mankind is made of dust by God (Ps. 103:14; Job 10:9; 1 Cor. 15:48). So, everyone is dust-animated-by-God, not just Adam.

Thanks for the feedback, this is one of the harder subject matters and its good to see studies that shed more light on it and allow the Holy Spirit to guide us in bringing greater understanding.