Greg's first deductive syllogism

[Carbon]

Calvin said God's will is a perfect unity, or "one", and the distinction between hidden and revealed will is not true, it only falsely "appears" to be true because human beings are afflicted with the limitation intellectual feebleness:



If Calvin was correct that the divine will is "one and undivided", then I'm forced to conclude that the distinction between decretive and preceptive will, that you allege to be true about god, is not true about god.

The premise to a syllogism must assert actual truth...not merely truth as wrongfully perceived by "feeble intellect...". Otherwise, yes, the syllogism is doomed be either invalid or unsound.

Thus the singular descriptive word "will" in P1 did not constitute the ambiguity or imprecision you thought it did. It was in perfect accord with what you and Calvin think is the actual truth about god's will. A will that is "one and undivided" is truthfully represented with the unqualified expression "will".

That is, when P1 says "The elect should do anything God wills them to do", you are wrong to complain that "will" doesn't specify which particular aspect, decretive or preceptive. Logic and truth are not served if they are based on what Calvin said were false perspectives arising from "feebleness of intellect..."

But anyway, I'll modify the syllogism to please the Calvinist critics, who seem to be perfectly certain that which particular "will" of God is meant here, makes significant difference:

• Premise 1: An elect sinner should do anything God has secretly willed them to do.
• Premise 2: God secretly wills for the elect sinner to sin.
• Conclusion: The elect should commit sin.

So if we forget the prior lesson which taught that the syllogism is doomed when it proceeds upon any premise that is actually false (like the premise that the difference between God's decretive and preceptive wills is not mere appearance, but actual truth), well, you can't dispute P1 because you believe it "true" that God has a secret will respecting an elect person.

You cannot dispute P2 because you are Calvinists. See WCF sec.3.

NOW tell me why the conclusion is false.

Greg, if I may ask, do you consider yourself a theoretical atheist? This is what I think, anyway. I know there are, I believe three types? I'm just wanting to get a clear idea of where your questions come from and why. Thanks

 

[fastfredy0]

Aside:
Since you are discussion theodocies to some degree, I have this quote that I'd like to share.
“The entire problem of theodicy arises from a wrong question or a wrong presumption. Rather one should see God as essentially good and deriving the definition of good from observing the one true and living God. We abstract an idea of good and then try to measure God against that human abstraction. That is always a losing proposition because we don’t know what ‘good’ is. The problem occurs when persons come up to us and says, “if God does this, He can’t be good.” They don’t realize that is an internal contradiction. The only God that exists is a God who is good. He defines what is good by consistency with His own character, and not by the fact that He corresponds to some arbitrary understanding of good. But we must never fall into the trap – we can’t accept the presumption that we are trying to define God over against a human abstraction called “good.” Instead, we must simply come back again to the fact that God is good. Whatever He does is good. Albert Mohler

.... back to the debate ... so many intelligent, articulate people. High "five" to @Greg for stating his view given the numerous opponents.

 

[Greg]

Institutes of the Christian Religion (I.xviii.3)​

Institutes (III.xxiv.17)​

Here Calvin clearly affirms:

• Secret (hidden) will → decree
• Revealed will → moral command

Institutes (I.xviii.3)​

This is one of the strongest statements:

• Calvin rejects the idea that God positively wills and does not will the same thing in the same sense
• The problem is not the distinction—it is contradiction

Did you not understand what you were reading?

Yes, I understood perfectly well what I read in Calvin.

Is that the point where you stopped reading and then were "forced" to conclude that something false is the truth.

Just because I quoted Calvin on a point doesn't mean I commit myself to the proposition that he was consistent in every other view he expressed about the subject. If you quote an Arminian as being correct on a point of soteriology, do you commit yourself to the premise that anything else he said about the same subject was surely consistent with that initial point? Of course not.

If you read the whole thing with comprehension,

There is no "whole thing". I gave you a sufficiently long quotation to ensure Calvin's point would be understood correctly. The fact that Calvin said something else on the same topic elsewhere doesn't mean I misunderstood him. Yes, Calvin believed we have a duty to obey God regardless of the secret divine decree. And I say about Calvin, what you say about all non-Calvinist Christians: his view of theology was riddled with inconsistencies.

you would reach the opposite conclusion---if you measure yourself by the same standards of logic that you apply to Christians. Do you know what "simple" means in reference to God in Calvin's statement?

Yes, in the context, it means the next word he used: "undivided" and in context that means the accusation that God secretly wills what he openly forbids is, according to Calvin, false.

Calvin in the very quote you quoted, and Reformed theology do not agree with your misquided interpretation of what Calvin said so your P1 according to what you said (see below) is not actual truth but "truth as wrongfully perceived by------".

I've explained my justification for thinking I interpeted my quote of Calvin correctly, so now you are just pontificating.

P1 isn't based on what Calvin said so you still have the problem of not defining "will".

Dismissed.

Assuming "should" still means moral obligation, then your premise is in tension with your conclusion, because you are deriving a moral obligation to sin---a contradiction in terms.

no, Ariel THINKS a moral obligation to sin is a contradiction in terms. But Ariel, not being god, is capable of becoming defiantly dogmatic in defending what could well prove to be heresy...just like Ariel thinks thousand of other Christians have done and currently do. If the bible said moral obligation to sin was a contradiction in terms, I would accuse the biblical authors of inconsistency.

God cannot obligate what he forbids.

But God can obligate what he "wills".

Your argument is not just unsound but internally incoherent.

Dismissed.

P2 trades on a well-jknown but unresoved anbiguity. In Reformed theology (which is what you are opposing) God's "secret will" ---his decree---includes the ordination of all that comes to pass, including sinful acts, but this does not mean that God morally wills sin in the same sense that he commands righteousness.

What's the difference between "morally will" and just plain "will"?

You are collapsing the distinction between God's decretive will and his perceptive will.

Because I find the distinction to be frivolous and born from nothing other than the inerrantist's need to adopt whatever theory will "reconcile" a story about god's secret will for murder, with another biblical story about God's revealed will "thou shalt not murder". I have excellent reasons to say it is reasonable to reject biblical inerrancy, so that's why I cannot sympathize with your incessant need to literally pull the cosmos inside out just to make sure bible inerrancy is defended to the absolute death.

Unless you can show that these are the same kind of willing your premise is equivocal and cannot support a sound conclusion.

Well first, that's YOUR view of the burden of proof. I reject your criticisms and believe the burden rests with you.

Second, as you well know, spiritually alive Trinitarian Arminians have been screaming for centuries that the Calvinist version of the distinction between God's decretive will and his preceptive will, is logically inconsistent. Yet here you are, pretending that a spiritually dead person like me should more accurately discern this stuff than a spiritually alive person. Sorry, I don't sympathize for one second with your view.

Third, if you want me to argue decretive and preceptive are the same kind of willing, I will. Just because my will for my child to clean her room can possibly also be classified as "preceptive" merely because I disclosed that will to her, doesn't mean it is possible for me to somehow "decretively" will that she disobey that command, unless we posit that my preceptive will was insincere...or that I am genuinely inconsistent.

And if I told anybody that a) I gave my daughter a command, and b) not only did I refuse to give her what she needed to obey that command, I also secretly intended her to disobey that command...they would probably try to have me involuntarily committed.

And your attempt to do that failed because the person you quoted to verify, they were the same kind of willing said the opposite of what you claim he said. He (Calvin) distinguished the two wills.

I never expressed or implied I think Calvin is inerrant, yet you treat Calvin like inerrant scripture, and pretend no contextually justified interpretation could possibly be correct unless it can be harmonized with everything else he said.

 

[Greg]

Greg, if I may ask, do you consider yourself a theoretical atheist? This is what I think, anyway. I know there are, I believe three types? I'm just wanting to get a clear idea of where your questions come from and why. Thanks

You mean.. somebody at christcentered managed to communicate to me WITHOUT orders that I stop manifesting transparently obvious violations of basic logic? I'll have to get back you later, after I've caught my breath.

I'm a theoretical atheist because I argue to justify the reasonableness of my atheism. I do not deny the possibility of some higher form of life out there. I deny that any possible higher form of life could possibly be consistent with everything the bible says about "god".

Since atheism doesn't require perfect certainty, I can "deny god's existence" without committing myself to being perfectly certain such view is true. That's why atheism and agnosticism aren't necessarily opposite.

I'm also a practical atheist because I do not acknowledge god in any way other than when I have to say the word to let somebody else know the subject matter I speak of.

 

[Greg]

....High "five" to @Greg for stating his view given the numerous opponents.

Thanks for the compliment.

 

[Carbon]

You mean.. somebody at christcentered managed to communicate to me WITHOUT orders that I stop manifesting transparently obvious violations of basic logic? I'll have to get back you later, after I've caught my breath.

Well, I thought to go easy on you, Greg, because unless you're an elect, you're going to have serious issues in the future.

I'm a theoretical atheist because I argue to justify the reasonableness of my atheism.

Yes, I know, they try to prove there is no God with rational arguments. But that in itself is irrational IMO

I do not deny the possibility of some higher form of life out there. I deny that any possible higher form of life could possibly be consistent with everything the bible says about "god".

Interesting, well kinda.

Since atheism doesn't require perfect certainty, I can "deny god's existence" without committing myself to being perfectly certain such view is true. That's why atheism and agnosticism aren't necessarily opposite.

Thats sad to hear.

I'm also a practical atheist because I do not acknowledge god in any way other than when I have to say the word to let somebody else know the subject matter I speak of.

There really is no sense in speaking about God or the knowledge of God unless it's assumed that God exists, dont you agree?

Another question, if you dont mind? Have you had, or don't you agree you would have much better success debating against an Arminian than a Calvinist?

 

[Greg]

There really is no sense in speaking about God or the knowledge of God unless it's assumed that God exists, dont you agree?

That is standard presuppositionalist fare (i.e., God is the necessary precondition of intelligibility).

Please first declare what sort of presuppositionalist you are (Bahnsen, Framian, Clarkian, Van Tilian, other), so that I can taper my arguments to anticipate your assumptions.

Another question, if you dont mind? Have you had, or don't you agree you would have much better success debating against an Arminian than a Calvinist?

No. That sounds like you think Calvinism has thicker armor than Arminianism.

But I will say that IMO presuppositionalism is far closer to the apostolic method than Arminianism. The apostles did not provide arguments showing that the supernatural resurrection of Jesus was more probable than any purely naturalistic theory. They simply declared the resurrection, then condemned anything that dared to look like it was contemplating getting in their way.

 

[Carbon]

That is standard presuppositionalist fare (i.e., God is the necessary precondition of intelligibility).

Interesting.

Please first declare what sort of presuppositionalist you are (Bahnsen, Framian, Clarkian, Van Tilian, other), so that I can taper my arguments to anticipate your assumptions.

I don't believe I could honestly give you a correct answer; I am not trained in any. Just shooting from the hip.

No.

I thought you might say that.

That sounds like you think Calvinism has thicker armor than Arminianism.

You think that has to do with armor? Nope, but it's an interesting answer. It actually would relate to your Calvinism that you were. I was asking to get to know you better and see where you're coming from. That's all.

I'll tell you something, I dont believe you were a Calvinist, I'm pretty convinced you were not. I know you probably heard this before. It just answers a lot for me. No need to go on more with this.

But I will say that IMO presuppositionalism is far closer to the apostolic method than Arminianism. The apostles did not provide arguments showing that the supernatural resurrection of Jesus was more probable than any purely naturalistic theory. They simply declared the resurrection, then condemned anything that dared to look like it was contemplating getting in their way.

Okay

 

[Arial]

Yes, I understood perfectly well what I read in Calvin.

Then you deliberately misrepresented him. Either way, your syllogism fails.

Just because I quoted Calvin on a point doesn't mean I commit myself to the proposition that he was consistent in every other view he expressed about the subject. If you quote an Arminian as being correct on a point of soteriology, do you commit yourself to the premise that anything else he said about the same subject was surely consistent with that initial point? Of course not.

That is not what I asked you and in fact doesn't even relate to what I asked. Also known as deflection.

There is no "whole thing". I gave you a sufficiently long quotation to ensure Calvin's point would be understood correctly. The fact that Calvin said something else on the same topic elsewhere doesn't mean I misunderstood him. Yes, Calvin believed we have a duty to obey God regardless of the secret divine decree.

I quoted from the very same thing you did. And I made that comment after reading what you quoted. Nothing else. So, I ask again, did you read with comprehension all those words of Calvin that you quoted?

Yes, in the context, it means the next word he used: "undivided" and in context that means the accusation that God secretly wills what he openly forbids is, according to Calvin, false.

Which means that your P2 "God secretly wills that the elect should sin" is false. If God did not forbid people to sin there would be no such thing as sin. You are the one who said God secretly wills that the elect should sin (should being moral obligation in your P's). Which means your conclusion is false. You did NOT comprehend what you quoted from Calvin.

And yes, "simple" means undivided as a basic definition but what does it mean when applied to God. It means he is not made up of parts---that his attributes are not parts of him but are him. They are all equally at play all of the time and in every place. What Calvin was saying about simple and feeble minds was related to that. We are not capable of fully grasping that and cannot see things from that perspective having never experienced such a thing. That is why it looks to you like when the WCF says God ordains all things that come to pass even sin that he wills people to sin. If that were the case, then he could not stand in judgement of it. A person can begin to understand it correctly, and once they do, it is completely logical and reasonable. But an unregenerate person striking out at what they don't even believe in (isn't that like tilting at windmills?) is blind to it.

I've explained my justification for thinking I interpeted my quote of Calvin correctly, so now you are just pontificating.

No, you actually did interpret him incorrectly. That is a provable fact---provable by simply reading it.

Dismissed.

Well, that's one way to throw your own argument out the window all by yourself.

no, Ariel THINKS a moral obligation to sin is a contradiction in terms. But Ariel, not being god, is capable of becoming defiantly dogmatic in defending what could well prove to be heresy...just like Ariel thinks thousand of other Christians have done and currently do. If the bible said moral obligation to sin was a contradiction in terms, I would accuse the biblical authors of inconsistency.

Just like clockwork as I said in a previous thread.

It is your P1 that presents itself as a moral obligation to sin. How is that not a contradiction in terms since sin is amoral? And you do accuse the biblical authors of inconsistency even though it teaches that our moral obligation is to NOT sin.

But God can obligate what he "wills".

And he does not will what he forbids.

Dismissed.

Well, that's one way to throw your whole argument out the window all by yourself.

What's the difference between "morally will" and just plain "will"?

Not all things that are willed my people are moral. It was not moral for evil men to hang an innocent man on a cross to die. They did it because they were jealous and furious. It was God's will that they do so in order that Jesus could rescue a people from clutches of the evil one. He was not going to leave his Son in that grave, but raise him to life as the victorious King of kings and Lord of lords. And give him a host of redeemed creatures made glorious by his work. And even though it was Jesus' very purpose in coming, to die on that cross bearing the sins of many and setting them free; and even though God willed it, God did not make those men nail the nails. Those men were doing exactly what they wanted to do.

Because I find the distinction to be frivolous and born from nothing other than the inerrantist's need to adopt whatever theory will "reconcile" a story about god's secret will for murder, with another biblical story about God's revealed will "thou shalt not murder".

And even so, you would be mistaken. Is it reasonable to think you might be mistaken?

I have excellent reasons to say it is reasonable to reject biblical inerrancy, so that's why I cannot sympathize with your incessant need to literally pull the cosmos inside out just to make sure bible inerrancy is defended to the absolute death.

As I have said before---it is quite natural for you to look at it that way. As I have shown you before with particular scriptures, you are a living example of Scriptures unerring truth.

Well first, that's YOUR view of the burden of proof. I reject your criticisms and believe the burden rests with you.

I long ago figured out you reject everything you don't like. But the burden does not rest with me because you are the one who presented the deductive syllogism and directly connected it to Reformed theology. You have presented a syllogism to Reformed and tried to use your own definitions not theirs and then object when they point out you can't do that and still be logical.

Second, as you well know, spiritually alive Trinitarian Arminians have been screaming for centuries that the Calvinist version of the distinction between God's decretive will and his preceptive will, is logically inconsistent. Yet here you are, pretending that a spiritually dead person like me should more accurately discern this stuff than a spiritually alive person. Sorry, I don't sympathize for one second with your view.

Well A'ist argue against it for the simple reason that if it is true their proof texts won't work anymore. But what does that have to do with this conversation? Nothing at all.

Third, if you want me to argue decretive and preceptive are the same kind of willing, I will. Just because my will for my child to clean her room can possibly also be classified as "preceptive" merely because I disclosed that will to her, doesn't mean it is possible for me to somehow "decretively" will that she disobey that command, unless we posit that my preceptive will was insincere...or that I am genuinely inconsistent.

It would bring your ideas of fatherhood into question. Other than that, it is about as faulty an analogy against God's decretive and perceptive wills as I have ever heard.

I never expressed or implied I think Calvin is inerrant, yet you treat Calvin like inerrant scripture, and pretend no contextually justified interpretation could possibly be correct unless it can be harmonized with everything else he said

I never said you did imply that you think Calvin is inerrant and I am not the one who brought up Calvin. You did and though you were seriously misguided as to what you thought he said, you are the one who used him to verify your position. Not me. But your response above was 100% unrelated to the quote of mine it is responding to.

 

[fastfredy0]

@Greg ... you're obviously well educated in regards to Calvinism/Christianity. Why do you spend time on what you have concluded to be a fantasy?

 

[Bruiser]

No, the title doesn't mean this thread is my first experience with deductive syllogisms

What if you found a valid and sound deductive syllogism that drew a conclusion you think conflicted with the bible? Would you be open to the possibility that biblical inerrancy is a false doctrine? Or would you contradict the Calvinist view that logic arises from God's nature, and suddenly discover that logic isn't god's nature after all?

• P1 - Major Premise: The elect should do anything God wills then to do.
• P2 - Minor Premise: God wills for the elect to repent of their sins.
• C - The elect should repent of their sins

If you think premise 1 is false, why?

If you think premise 2 is false, why?

If you think the conclusion doesn't logically follow, why?

Greg, the Syllogism is Valid and Sound...

 

[Arial]

Calvin said God's will is a perfect unity, or "one", and the distinction between hidden and revealed will is not true, it only falsely "appears" to be true because human beings are afflicted with the limitation intellectual feebleness:

That is precisely backwards of what he said.

 

[John Bauer]

Part 1​

Calvin said God's will is a perfect unity or "one," and the distinction between hidden and revealed will is not true, it only falsely "appears" to be true because human beings are afflicted with the limitation intellectual feebleness.

Wow. Okay, so evidently our friendly neighborhood atheist has either not read Calvin very carefully or has quoted him tendentiously. That is disappointing, though not surprising. A brief excursus is therefore warranted for the sake of our readers, because Greg has misrepresented Calvin rather badly. This could have been avoided had he not omitted 577 words by means of four ellipses, one of which was concealed (since he truncated Augustine’s quotation without indicating the omission). All of the omitted material strengthens, rather than weakens, the need for distinction in what God wills. (It also could have been avoided if he had considered the 1,081 words that follow his selected excerpt, where Calvin explicitly refuted the very inference Greg draws.)

Calvin is answering those who object that God must have two contradictory wills if he secretly decrees what he openly forbids in his law. Calvin’s answer is that God does not and indeed cannot have two wills, for God is simple or not composed of parts. That is why Calvin says God’s will “in himself” is “one and undivided.” He is denying any contradiction in God; he is not denying all distinction in the way God’s one will is understood. (Stated more clearly: A contradiction between two wills would require two wills. But God’s will is one, so we cannot treat this as competing volitions in God but rather as distinguishing between what he wills.)

In fact, in this very chapter Calvin says that people “improperly confound” God’s hidden will (decree) and revealed will (precept), and he adds that “from innumerable examples” we know that “there is the greatest difference between them.” And then he proceeds to list some of those examples, the clearest of which in my judgment was the appointment of Jeroboam as king.

In other words, what Calvin argued doesn’t actually license the inference Greg drew. Calvin is not saying “the distinction between hidden and revealed will is not true,” as Greg claimed. God’s hidden will and revealed will are not undifferentiated. Calvin is saying that this distinction doesn’t somehow imply two wills in God, much less contradiction in God. He is carefully explaining how this distinction does not divide God. Divine simplicity rules out two wills in God, and especially two contradictory wills in God, but it does not rule out the distinction between decree and command in the one divine will.

That is what broke between what Calvin wrote and what Greg read. Calvin argues that God’s will is one and Greg thinks that eliminates any real distinction between decree and precept—which directly contradicts what Calvin wrote. “If Calvin was correct, that the divine will is one and undivided,” Greg said, “then I’m forced to conclude that the distinction between decretive and preceptive will … is not true about God.” But Calvin explicitly says the opposite.

As a side note, the example of Shimei in particular destroys Greg’s argument concerning Hitler. Although David recognizes that Shimei was acting by God’s ordination, Calvin said, he is not praising Shimei’s conduct as obedience to a divine command. He is not saying that this “petulant dog” was “yielding obedience to a divine command,” but instead he is recognizing Shimei as the rod God is using to chastise him, and so David “submits patiently to be chastised.” Calvin says that’s how we must think here (“Thus we must hold”): God accomplishes by means of the wicked what he has secretly decreed, but “they are not excusable as if they were obeying his precept, which of set purpose they violate according to their lust.”

Greg said it most aptly: “The syllogism is doomed to be either invalid or unsound.” Let’s find out which.

 

[John Bauer]

Part 2​

The singular descriptive word "will" in P1 did not constitute the ambiguity or imprecision you thought it did.

It turns out this is false and my original judgment was spot on. There is a distinction in what God wills, as even Calvin made clear, a distinction which Greg’s argument fails to maintain or even recognize. His argument was not “in perfect accord” with “the actual truth” about God's will after all. The problem was precisely his equivocation of the word “will” and how it shifts from one premise to the next, made clear by the fact that he meant “should” in the sense of moral obligation. Feel free to revisit my critique here, as it stands unrefuted.

Logic and truth are not served if they are based on what Calvin said were false perspectives arising from "feebleness of intellect..."

Calvin attributed this “feebleness” not to those who distinguish between decree and precept but to those who “cannot comprehend how, though after a different manner, he wills and wills not the very same thing.”

But anyway, I'll modify the syllogism to please the Calvinist critics who seem to be perfectly certain that which particular "will" of God is meant here makes significant difference:

His revised syllogism is still not a syllogism—whether categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive—and it fares no better than his first attempt. In fact, its failure is a lot clearer. Let’s take a look.

Premise 1: An elect sinner should do anything God has secretly willed them to do.
Premise 2: God secretly wills for the elect sinner to sin.
Conclusion: The elect should commit sin.

“Now, tell me why the conclusion is false,” Greg said.

This revised argument definitely removes the equivocation but it was a costly move, for now Premise 1 is explicitly false because it is not a Christian moral principle. If we remember that he is using “should” in the sense of moral obligation, it is not the case that the elect are morally obligated to do whatever God has secretly decreed—they can't, for they have no idea what he has secretly decreed. They are morally obligated to obey what God has revealed and commanded.

So the revised argument is cleaner, but only because it now states the error openly instead of smuggling it in through an equivocation. It proves nothing except that a false premise yields a blasphemous conclusion.

If I may adapt Greg’s words to this occasion, let us not soon “forget the prior lesson which taught that the syllogism is doomed when it proceeds upon any premise that is actually false.”

 

[makesends]

Part 1​

Wow. Okay, so evidently our friendly neighborhood atheist has either not read Calvin very carefully or has quoted him tendentiously. That is disappointing, though not surprising. A brief excursus is therefore warranted for the sake of our readers, because Greg has misrepresented Calvin rather badly. This could have been avoided had he not omitted 577 words by means of four ellipses, one of which was concealed (since he truncated Augustine’s quotation without indicating the omission). All of the omitted material strengthens, rather than weakens, the need for distinction in what God wills. (It also could have been avoided if he had considered the 1,081 words that follow his selected excerpt, where Calvin explicitly refuted the very inference Greg draws.)

Calvin is answering those who object that God must have two contradictory wills if he secretly decrees what he openly forbids in his law. Calvin’s answer is that God does not and indeed cannot have two wills, for God is simple or not composed of parts. That is why Calvin says God’s will “in himself” is “one and undivided.” He is denying any contradiction in God; he is not denying all distinction in the way God’s one will is understood. (Stated more clearly: A contradiction between two wills would require two wills. But God’s will is one, so we cannot treat this as competing volitions in God but rather as distinguishing between what he wills.)

In fact, in this very chapter Calvin says that people “improperly confound” God’s hidden will (decree) and revealed will (precept), and he adds that “from innumerable examples” we know that “there is the greatest difference between them.” And then he proceeds to list some of those examples, the clearest of which in my judgment was the appointment of Jeroboam as king.

In other words, what Calvin argued doesn’t actually license the inference Greg drew. Calvin is not saying “the distinction between hidden and revealed will is not true,” as Greg claimed. God’s hidden will and revealed will are not undifferentiated. Calvin is saying that this distinction doesn’t somehow imply two wills in God, much less contradiction in God. He is carefully explaining how this distinction does not divide God. Divine simplicity rules out two wills in God, and especially two contradictory wills in God, but it does not rule out the distinction between decree and command in the one divine will.

That is what broke between what Calvin wrote and what Greg read. Calvin argues that God’s will is one and Greg thinks that eliminates any real distinction between decree and precept—which directly contradicts what Calvin wrote. “If Calvin was correct, that the divine will is one and undivided,” Greg said, “then I’m forced to conclude that the distinction between decretive and preceptive will … is not true about God.” But Calvin explicitly says the opposite.

As a side note, the example of Shimei in particular destroys Greg’s argument concerning Hitler. Although David recognizes that Shimei was acting by God’s ordination, Calvin said, he is not praising Shimei’s conduct as obedience to a divine command. He is not saying that this “petulant dog” was “yielding obedience to a divine command,” but instead he is recognizing Shimei as the rod God is using to chastise him, and so David “submits patiently to be chastised.” Calvin says that’s how we must think here (“Thus we must hold”): God accomplishes by means of the wicked what he has secretly decreed, but “they are not excusable as if they were obeying his precept, which of set purpose they violate according to their lust.”

Greg said it most aptly: “The syllogism is doomed to be either invalid or unsound.” Let’s find out which.

@Greg @Bruiser
I want to add this, for the participants and casual readers. To quote Calvin, for or against, is not the same as to represent Calvinism/Reformed doctrine. That is, though we like/agree with much of the Institutes, to quote him in order to defeat us does not work, unless we agree precisely with what he said. We do not worship Calvin. He is not even our leader.

 

[Carbon]

@Greg @Bruiser
I want to add this, for the participants and casual readers. To quote Calvin, for or against, is not the same as to represent Calvinism/Reformed doctrine. That is, though we like/agree with much of the Institutes, to quote him in order to defeat us does not work, unless we agree precisely with what he said. We do not worship Calvin. He is not even our leader.

Amen brother!

 

[Arial]

Of course not. It's just that fools like Ariel insist that to interpret one phrase of Calvin in a way that conflict with something else he believed, means such interpretation is surely false. That, my friend, is the mindset of Calvin-inerrancy, no less than it is the mind-set of bible inerrancy.

Hilarious. In order to appear the WINNER you have to completely misrepresent what I said, even though when you said it to me, I told you that I did not take a quote of Calvin from anyplace but the very quote you posted of Calvin. I simply showed you that in the very text you said Calvin said the secret and decretive will was false, that he was actually saying the opposite.

I can understand why that would be embarrassing for you because when you reread his words you probably realized I was right. So double shame on doing the same thing again when you know better. We only learn and improve when we own up to our mistakes and make sure we don't do that same thing again.