• **Notifications**: Notifications can be dismissed by clicking on the "x" on the righthand side of the notice.
  • **New Style**: You can now change style options. Click on the paintbrush at the bottom of this page.
  • **Donations**: If the Lord leads you please consider helping with monthly costs and up keep on our Forum. Click on the Donate link In the top menu bar. Thanks
  • **New Blog section**: There is now a blog section. Check it out near the Private Debates forum or click on the Blog link in the top menu bar.
  • Welcome Visitors! Join us and be blessed while fellowshipping and celebrating our Glorious Salvation In Christ Jesus.

Soul, Personhood, and Immortality: A Holistic Covenantal Anthropology

John Bauer

DialecticSkeptic
Staff member
Joined
Jun 19, 2023
Messages
1,043
Reaction score
2,181
Points
133
Age
46
Location
Canada
Faith
Reformed (URCNA)
Country
Canada
Marital status
Married
Politics
Kingdom of God

Disclaimer: This work is a personal theological synthesis and should not be understood as representing the formal doctrine of any church, denomination, confession, or theological tradition. While it engages and integrates ideas from multiple sources, it is offered solely as my own constructive articulation.

Soul, Personhood, and Immortality: A Holistic Covenantal Anthropology

This model stands in continuity with the Hebraic “whole person” anthropology of scripture. In the Old Testament, nephesh (“soul”) and in the New Testament, psyche, refer not to a separable, immaterial component but to the whole living person in relation to God. Human beings are portrayed as embodied creatures whose life depends entirely on God’s sustaining breath (Gen 2:7; Ps 104:29). The biblical hope is resurrection in a renewed creation, not the persistence of an immortal essence apart from the body.

In this holistic covenantal anthropology, the Hebraic whole-person view is developed systematically through the integration of Lynne R. Baker’s constitution view, Herman Dooyeweerd’s concept of the enkaptic structural whole, G. C. Berkouwer’s covenantal anthropology, Anthony Hoekema’s psychosomatic unity, J. Richard Middleton’s eschatological telos of the imago Dei, and Edward Fudge’s doctrine of conditional immortality. This synthesis preserves the holistic anthropology of scripture while grounding human identity, continuity, and destiny in God’s covenant faithfulness rather than in an inherent immortal substance.

Introduction​

The soul is not a separable, immaterial substance distinct from the material body, a view that emerged from later theological developments influenced by Hellenistic categories. Biblically speaking, the soul is the person—the whole human person in covenantal relation to God. As a psychosomatic unity, the human soul is biologically constituted but defined theologically by vocational identity, covenantal accountability, and eschatological destiny. Scripture presents this holistic anthropology in terms of man being constituted as a covenant creature made in the image of God, thus man's self-consciousness is a covenant-consciousness.

And to be truly human is to be in Christ. Outside of him, personhood remains disoriented and broken—and terminal (as the wicked are said to perish entirely). Christ is not merely the solution to a fallen anthropology, he is its fulfillment, pattern, and telos from the beginning. He is not merely an exemplar of restored humanity; he is the eschatological archetype in whom true humanity is defined and reconstituted. Our glorification, then (Rom 8:30), is the full realization of personhood: perfected covenant consciousness, embodied in resurrection glory, fully restored to communion with God.

In this view—shaped by Baker, Berkouwer, Dooyeweerd, Hoekema, Middleton, and Fudge—the human person is a psychosomatic unity, a covenantal creature made in the image of God, constituted biologically but defined theologically by vocation, covenantal accountability, and eschatological destiny. True selfhood is not reducible to physical processes nor identifiable with an immaterial substance, but is centered in the religious heart—man's supra-modal direction before God. Personhood is historically embedded, narratively shaped, and eschatologically oriented toward resurrection life in union with Christ.

Anthropological Structure — What We Are:

  • Psychosomatic Unity (Hoekema)
    • From Anthony Hoekema comes the valuable affirmation of psychosomatic unity—that man is an integrated whole of body and soul, without dualistic partitioning.
    • In relation to the intermediate state, this view does not affirm conscious disembodied existence as a necessity for continuity, but rather sees the person as preserved in covenant by the faithfulness of God, awaiting resurrection.
    • Continuity is grounded in divine faithfulness, not metaphysical survival.
  • Personhood as Constitution (Baker)
    • Following Lynne R. Baker, this view affirms that persons are constituted by, but not identical with, their bodies.
    • First-person perspective is seen not as autonomous self-awareness, but as covenantal self-consciousness: the creature's capacity to know, trust, and obey God.
    • Baker's insight, that personhood is not reducible to biology, is preserved while her secular framing is theologically reinterpreted.

Anthropological Orientation — Our Relation to God:

  • Man Before God (Berkouwer)
    • From G. C. Berkouwer comes the insistence that anthropology must be relational and covenantal, not metaphysical or speculative.
    • Terms like soul or spirit are treated as relational descriptors, not metaphysical parts.
    • The person is not a sum of components but stands as a whole in covenant before God.
  • Religious Heart as Center (Dooyeweerd)
    • Drawing from Herman Dooyeweerd, the person's true identity lies in the heart—the religious center that transcends all modal functions.
    • The soul is not a substance nor an aspect, but the directionally oriented center of human life, grounded in the law-order of God.
    • Human dignity is rooted in the heart's relation to God, not in rational or psychological functions.

Anthropological Destiny — Our Eschatological End:

  • Creational and Eschatological Embodiment (Middleton)
    • J. Richard Middleton's emphasis on creational embodiment and resurrection hope is also key.
    • The human person is not meant to escape the body but to be glorified in the body, ruling and reflecting God in the new creation. Salvation is not soul-flight but the restoration of whole persons in a renewed creation.
    • The imago Dei is not a static attribute but a dynamic calling: To reflect God’s rule in creation, to live in communion with God, and to represent him as a vice-regent.
  • Conditional Immortality (Fudge)
    • Informed by Edward W. Fudge, this view emphasizes that immortality is a salvific gift granted only to believers, wherein Christ brought life and immortality to light through the gospel. Man is not inherently immortal; God alone possesses immortality (1 Tim 6:16).
    • Those who remain spiritually separated from God will, in the end, be metaphysically separated from him. The human being subsists in metaphysical dependence on God, the self-existent and only source of all being. In the final judgment, the wicked are utterly cut off; that dependence is severed, and with it their very being.
    • This flows from Hoekema's psychosomatic unity, Baker's constitution view, Berkouwer's covenantal anthropology, the religious heart in Dooyeweerd's anthropology, and the glorification telos in Middleton’s theology of the imago Dei, such that the image of God is consummated in the fullness of resurrection life, Christocentric perfection, and eternal communion with God. In the eschaton, God will be all in all; those cut off from him perish entirely. Only in spiritual union with Christ is metaphysical union fully realized in glorification.

More on Dooyeweerd

Dooyeweerd sees the human being as an "enkaptic structural whole," meaning a complex unity with multiple irreducible aspects. The term "enkaptic" comes from the Greek "enkapsis," which Dooyeweerd uses to describe a special kind of relationship between different individuality structures that are bound together in a meaningful whole without losing their distinct identities or characteristics—differing structures, interlaced or interwoven, forming a complex unity, while each structure retains its own internal integrity and unique character.

In Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, an enkaptic structural whole is not a simple part-whole relationship. Instead—and here it coincides with Baker's constitution view—the different individuality structures in the whole are “restrictively bound” together, meaning one depends on the other in some way for its meaning or existence, but without destroying the peculiar character of either structure. For example:
  • A statue (an aesthetic individuality structure) is enkaptically bound to the marble (a physical individuality structure) from which it is formed. This illustrates Dooyeweerd’s enkaptic structural whole—and, in Baker’s terms, a constitution relation, which is one kind of enkaptic relation. The marble and the statue are so enkaptically bound as to constitute a singular whole; this enkaptic constitution means the marble remains marble even though it constitutes (is part of) the statue, while the statue as a whole is more than just the marble because the sculptor has given it form and meaning, making it the kind of thing it is.
  • In the same way, the human person (a covenantal–vocational individuality structure) is so enkaptically bound to the body (a physical–biological individuality structure) as to constitute a singular whole, a psychosomatic unity. The body remains a body even though it constitutes the person, while the person as a whole is more than just the body because God has endowed it with a first-person perspective (Baker), a covenantal identity and accountability before him (Berkouwer), an oriented religious heart (Dooyeweerd), and a destiny unto glorification in Christ (Middleton). This enkaptic constitution, defined covenantally, means that life endures only within the bond sustained by the self-existent God (Hoekema), and apart from that bond it ceases altogether (Fudge).
When Dooyeweerd calls the human being an "enkaptic structural whole," he means that a human is a complex unity composed of multiple irreducible individuality structures (such as biological, psychological, cultural, and spiritual aspects) woven together in such a way that each aspect remains distinct yet intrinsically connected to the others in the person’s existence. This avoids reductive dualism or mechanistic reduction, showing the deep interconnectedness of body, soul, and spirit, as well as the multifaceted dimensions of human experience that operate simultaneously and meaningfully.

In summary:
  • Enkaptic = interwoven, interlaced binding of diverse individuality structures in a whole.
  • The whole and its parts retain distinct identities and internal principles.
  • The relation is one of constitutive interdependence, in which each structure contributes to the meaningful unity of the whole while retaining its own integrity and distinctive properties.
  • Human beings, for Dooyeweerd, are enkaptic wholes made up of many irreducible but integrated modal aspects.
This concept is important for understanding his philosophical anthropology and broader metaphysics, giving a holistic and integrated picture of reality grounded in his modal theory and the sovereignty of God over all aspects of existence.


Addendum

Immortality is covenantal continuity, not ontological continuity. Out of the preceding integrated framework flows the idea that human beings don't inherently possess immortality by virtue of an enduring ontological essence. Life is sustained only within a covenantal bond with the self-existent God, and apart from that bond it ceases altogether.
 
Disclaimer: This work is a personal theological synthesis and should not be understood as representing the formal doctrine of any church, denomination, confession, or theological tradition. While it engages and integrates ideas from multiple sources, it is offered solely as my own constructive articulation.​
I'm not sure what you are articulating, here —your own view as a result of, or expressed as, a synthesis of the several views you describe? Or, rather, just a "book report" style short description of each view? I'm not sure I see a final description/ conclusion.

Soul, Personhood, and Immortality: A Holistic Covenantal Anthropology

This model stands in continuity with the Hebraic “whole person” anthropology of scripture. In the Old Testament, nephesh (“soul”) and in the New Testament, psyche, refer not to a separable, immaterial component but to the whole living person in relation to God. Human beings are portrayed as embodied creatures whose life depends entirely on God’s sustaining breath (Gen 2:7; Ps 104:29). The biblical hope is resurrection in a renewed creation, not the persistence of an immortal essence apart from the body.

In this holistic covenantal anthropology, the Hebraic whole-person view is developed systematically through the integration of Lynne R. Baker’s constitution view, Herman Dooyeweerd’s concept of the enkaptic structural whole, G. C. Berkouwer’s covenantal anthropology, Anthony Hoekema’s psychosomatic unity, J. Richard Middleton’s eschatological telos of the imago Dei, and Edward Fudge’s doctrine of conditional immortality. This synthesis preserves the holistic anthropology of scripture while grounding human identity, continuity, and destiny in God’s covenant faithfulness rather than in an inherent immortal substance.

Introduction​

The soul is not a separable, immaterial substance distinct from the material body, a view that emerged from later theological developments influenced by Hellenistic categories. Biblically speaking, the soul is the person—the whole human person in covenantal relation to God. As a psychosomatic unity, the human soul is biologically constituted but defined theologically by vocational identity, covenantal accountability, and eschatological destiny. Scripture presents this holistic anthropology in terms of man being constituted as a covenant creature made in the image of God, thus man's self-consciousness is a covenant-consciousness.

And to be truly human is to be in Christ. Outside of him, personhood remains disoriented and broken—and terminal (as the wicked are said to perish entirely). Christ is not merely the solution to a fallen anthropology, he is its fulfillment, pattern, and telos from the beginning. He is not merely an exemplar of restored humanity; he is the eschatological archetype in whom true humanity is defined and reconstituted. Our glorification, then (Rom 8:30), is the full realization of personhood: perfected covenant consciousness, embodied in resurrection glory, fully restored to communion with God.

In this view—shaped by Baker, Berkouwer, Dooyeweerd, Hoekema, Middleton, and Fudge—the human person is a psychosomatic unity, a covenantal creature made in the image of God, constituted biologically but defined theologically by vocation, covenantal accountability, and eschatological destiny. True selfhood is not reducible to physical processes nor identifiable with an immaterial substance, but is centered in the religious heart—man's supra-modal direction before God. Personhood is historically embedded, narratively shaped, and eschatologically oriented toward resurrection life in union with Christ.

Anthropological Structure — What We Are:

  • Psychosomatic Unity (Hoekema)
    • From Anthony Hoekema comes the valuable affirmation of psychosomatic unity—that man is an integrated whole of body and soul, without dualistic partitioning.
    • In relation to the intermediate state, this view does not affirm conscious disembodied existence as a necessity for continuity, but rather sees the person as preserved in covenant by the faithfulness of God, awaiting resurrection.
    • Continuity is grounded in divine faithfulness, not metaphysical survival.
  • Personhood as Constitution (Baker)
    • Following Lynne R. Baker, this view affirms that persons are constituted by, but not identical with, their bodies.
    • First-person perspective is seen not as autonomous self-awareness, but as covenantal self-consciousness: the creature's capacity to know, trust, and obey God.
    • Baker's insight, that personhood is not reducible to biology, is preserved while her secular framing is theologically reinterpreted.

Anthropological Orientation — Our Relation to God:

  • Man Before God (Berkouwer)
    • From G. C. Berkouwer comes the insistence that anthropology must be relational and covenantal, not metaphysical or speculative.
    • Terms like soul or spirit are treated as relational descriptors, not metaphysical parts.
    • The person is not a sum of components but stands as a whole in covenant before God.
  • Religious Heart as Center (Dooyeweerd)
    • Drawing from Herman Dooyeweerd, the person's true identity lies in the heart—the religious center that transcends all modal functions.
Several places throughout, I'm not sure of what is being said, because of certain terms lacking explanation —for example, Dooyeweerd's use of the term, "law-order of God." I can only guess he means something like what we might call, God's say-so, or God's Decree. But I understand it is necessary to keep it brief.
    • The soul is not a substance nor an aspect, but the directionally oriented center of human life, grounded in the law-order of God.
    • Human dignity is rooted in the heart's relation to God, not in rational or psychological functions.
So much of this rings true with me, above and below this comment, philosophically consistent with the fact of God being the very source and sustenance of existence, and theologically consistent with God's utter sovereignty and the power or drive of his purpose in creating. You've probably heard me say that the best self-esteem comes from knowing that I am only ever whatever God's purpose is for me, and what he sees 'as me'.

Anthropological Destiny — Our Eschatological End:

  • Creational and Eschatological Embodiment (Middleton)
    • J. Richard Middleton's emphasis on creational embodiment and resurrection hope is also key.
    • The human person is not meant to escape the body but to be glorified in the body, ruling and reflecting God in the new creation. Salvation is not soul-flight but the restoration of whole persons in a renewed creation.
    • The imago Dei is not a static attribute but a dynamic calling: To reflect God’s rule in creation, to live in communion with God, and to represent him as a vice-regent.
  • Conditional Immortality (Fudge)
    • Informed by Edward W. Fudge, this view emphasizes that immortality is a salvific gift granted only to believers, wherein Christ brought life and immortality to light through the gospel. Man is not inherently immortal; God alone possesses immortality (1 Tim 6:16).
    • Those who remain spiritually separated from God will, in the end, be metaphysically separated from him. The human being subsists in metaphysical dependence on God, the self-existent and only source of all being. In the final judgment, the wicked are utterly cut off; that dependence is severed, and with it their very being.
    • This flows from Hoekema's psychosomatic unity, Baker's constitution view, Berkouwer's covenantal anthropology, the religious heart in Dooyeweerd's anthropology, and the glorification telos in Middleton’s theology of the imago Dei, such that the image of God is consummated in the fullness of resurrection life, Christocentric perfection, and eternal communion with God. In the eschaton, God will be all in all; those cut off from him perish entirely. Only in spiritual union with Christ is metaphysical union fully realized in glorification.

More on Dooyeweerd

Dooyeweerd sees the human being as an "enkaptic structural whole," meaning a complex unity with multiple irreducible aspects. The term "enkaptic" comes from the Greek "enkapsis," which Dooyeweerd uses to describe a special kind of relationship between different individuality structures that are bound together in a meaningful whole without losing their distinct identities or characteristics—differing structures, interlaced or interwoven, forming a complex unity, while each structure retains its own internal integrity and unique character.

In Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, an enkaptic structural whole is not a simple part-whole relationship. Instead—and here it coincides with Baker's constitution view—the different individuality structures in the whole are “restrictively bound” together, meaning one depends on the other in some way for its meaning or existence, but without destroying the peculiar character of either structure. For example:
  • A statue (an aesthetic individuality structure) is enkaptically bound to the marble (a physical individuality structure) from which it is formed. This illustrates Dooyeweerd’s enkaptic structural whole—and, in Baker’s terms, a constitution relation, which is one kind of enkaptic relation. The marble and the statue are so enkaptically bound as to constitute a singular whole; this enkaptic constitution means the marble remains marble even though it constitutes (is part of) the statue, while the statue as a whole is more than just the marble because the sculptor has given it form and meaning, making it the kind of thing it is.
  • In the same way, the human person (a covenantal–vocational individuality structure) is so enkaptically bound to the body (a physical–biological individuality structure) as to constitute a singular whole, a psychosomatic unity. The body remains a body even though it constitutes the person, while the person as a whole is more than just the body because God has endowed it with a first-person perspective (Baker), a covenantal identity and accountability before him (Berkouwer), an oriented religious heart (Dooyeweerd), and a destiny unto glorification in Christ (Middleton). This enkaptic constitution, defined covenantally, means that life endures only within the bond sustained by the self-existent God (Hoekema), and apart from that bond it ceases altogether (Fudge).
When Dooyeweerd calls the human being an "enkaptic structural whole," he means that a human is a complex unity composed of multiple irreducible individuality structures (such as biological, psychological, cultural, and spiritual aspects) woven together in such a way that each aspect remains distinct yet intrinsically connected to the others in the person’s existence. This avoids reductive dualism or mechanistic reduction, showing the deep interconnectedness of body, soul, and spirit, as well as the multifaceted dimensions of human experience that operate simultaneously and meaningfully.

In summary:
  • Enkaptic = interwoven, interlaced binding of diverse individuality structures in a whole.
  • The whole and its parts retain distinct identities and internal principles.
  • The relation is one of constitutive interdependence, in which each structure contributes to the meaningful unity of the whole while retaining its own integrity and distinctive properties.
  • Human beings, for Dooyeweerd, are enkaptic wholes made up of many irreducible but integrated modal aspects.
This concept is important for understanding his philosophical anthropology and broader metaphysics, giving a holistic and integrated picture of reality grounded in his modal theory and the sovereignty of God over all aspects of existence.
Not that this at all denies what Scripture presents as a 'putting-off' of this body, which it calls this 'tent', and being clothed, but I mention it as a kind of antithesis for the sake of perspective.

Addendum

Immortality is covenantal continuity, not ontological continuity. Out of the preceding integrated framework flows the idea that human beings don't inherently possess immortality by virtue of an enduring ontological essence. Life is sustained only within a covenantal bond with the self-existent God, and apart from that bond it ceases altogether.
I think I completely agree with this, except that your conclusion seems to me to fall short of what you have so far presented as our very ontology being God's work (my words). It falls short in that you suppose the ceasing to be a necessary logical conclusion to God abandoning them altogether. I think that jumps a few logical steps.

And there, I don't mean to say that they continue to exist—not at all. I'm saying that the terminology you use is necessarily time-passage assuming, or assumes a necessary sequence of events / states. In this matter is touched the mystery of just what life is, and what death is (particularly the "second death"). What you describe as a ceasing, I find myself compelled to describe as mere fact. THAT is what they are. Already, but not yet.

This is partly why I think the what the Bible describes as what WE take to mean one suffers in hell for an infinite time, I prefer to think of as merely fact—intensity of experience, perhaps. Neither with beginning nor with ending, but simply, what it is to be abandoned by God.

And conversely, what we are when glorified. In this sense, I say, neither the born-again, nor the reprobate, are yet complete persons. One way I think of it is that we will be utterly changed, and they will be utterly abandoned. That is who God created.

Forgive my inability to be clear. Ha! and yes, in part because it is not a complete thought.
 
Back
Top