I've read a few back and forth exchanges in a different forum over the topic of responsibility and causation. I hope to write a small piece addressing various issues informing that discussion.
The Prior Discussion
One poster advocates that God is the ultimate cause of all things, but people are the efficient cause of their sin.
The other poster advocates that each human being is the ultimate cause of his sin, and he accuses the other poster of making God responsible for man's sin.
This is a basic summary of their exchange.
Competing Views of Responsibility and Human Freedom
In that prior discussion, both posters employ different frameworks for understanding the nature of human freedom and responsibility. This difference leads both in radically different directions. The second poster holds to a modified or weaker form of libertarian freedom, and the first poster probably holds to a form of compatibilistic freedom.
Two key features inform libertarian freedom. Ultimate human causality with respect to the will, or at least an ultimate first move of the will in determining future states of the will, this ultimacy defines the first aspect of the poster's view of libertarian freedom. The second key feature is the ability to do otherwise; at minimum this is true with respect to that initial first choice. Apparently, this is not true for future choices that have been determined by the first.
A few basic features inform a compatiblistic view of the will and choice-making. Human choices are made on account of causal reasons. Hence, as Jonathan Edwards pointed out, "to choose is to prefer." A choice is a selection in keeping with one's highest preference. Often times this is described in other terms of a person choosing what he wants. When a person does what he most wants or preferrs, then he is responsible for the choice. Because choices are inherently caused, the type of causation is extremely important. Some types of causation do remove responsibility while other types of causation do not remove responsibility.
Libertarian freedom, because of its view of human ultimacy, sees any form of ultimate divine causation as removing human accountability.
Compatibilistic freedom, because of its view of human nature, sees a clear difference between transcendent causation and imminent, internal causation. Thusly, human accountability is maintain even though the person could not have done otherwise.
Causal Conflation Fallacy
Because libertarian freedom holds to human ultimacy with respect to at least the initial movement of the will, the advocate will reject any and all forms of causation that might make the will unable to choose otherwise. Unfortunately, this leads the advocate to ignore the important distinctions of the compatibilist. The distinctions between ultimate, proximate, primary, secondary, efficient, internal, external, imminent, and transcendent are all ignored. This leads to the causal conflation fallacy and two people talking past each other. The libertarian advocate deceptively conflates all forms of causation into only "cause." Even if a person, on compatibilist terms, does something that they want to do, and the person is the immediate cause of their sin, the libertarian ignores all of these extremely important distinctions (establishing responsibility upon non-libertarian grounds) and focuses upon God's ultimate causality. This "turning a blind eye" to radically important distinctions of causality is what I am calling the "causal conflation fallacy."
The fact is that the Bible advocates a rather complex, multifaceted system of cause and effect. Take the crucifixion as an example. One of my teachers asked the class, "who caused Jesus' death." Note the word "cause" here. Also note the ambiguity. (1) We can note the language of Is 53 as the Father crushes the Son. (2) We can note that Jesus says that no one takes his life, but he lays it down. (3) We can note the multiple human groups involved in the false condemnation of Jesus. (4) We can note the Roman soldiers as they whipped and nailed Jesus to the tree. (5) We can note our own role in contributing our sin, as our sin was laid upon the spotless lamb of God. In each of these examples a different type of causation is biblically warranted. In the realm of providence, God's sustaining hand is often differentiated from His imminent causation. You also have different persons of the Trinity contributing to different causal roles in the application of salvation. In short, the Bible advocates a rather complex, multifaceted system of cause and effect. The causal conflation fallacy ignores the various types with only the sole focus of maintaining human ultimacy with respect to at least the first move of the will. Do compabilists claim to know all things with respect to responsibility? No, but much of what they say goes ignored by the causal conflation fallacy.
Conclusion
A few concluding thoughts encapsulate this post so far. Ideas have consequences; they lead people to different conclusions (note the causal reality of beliefs upon conclusions, and the conclusions lead to decisions to post). The libertarian view of the will leads its advocate to lie and grossly distort the compatibilistic view. The lying takes place when the accusation is made that the other person is making God responsible for sin. A difference in understanding responsibility, choice-making, and causation ought to be acknowledged. This difference ought to lead to a nuanced understanding of important causal distinctions, but sometimes these distinctions are glossed over leading people to make false accusations. I hope that this post proves helpful to aid people to wade through some difficult discussions. Does this post address every issue? Not by a long shot, but it serves as an elementary springboard.
The Prior Discussion
One poster advocates that God is the ultimate cause of all things, but people are the efficient cause of their sin.
The other poster advocates that each human being is the ultimate cause of his sin, and he accuses the other poster of making God responsible for man's sin.
This is a basic summary of their exchange.
Competing Views of Responsibility and Human Freedom
In that prior discussion, both posters employ different frameworks for understanding the nature of human freedom and responsibility. This difference leads both in radically different directions. The second poster holds to a modified or weaker form of libertarian freedom, and the first poster probably holds to a form of compatibilistic freedom.
Two key features inform libertarian freedom. Ultimate human causality with respect to the will, or at least an ultimate first move of the will in determining future states of the will, this ultimacy defines the first aspect of the poster's view of libertarian freedom. The second key feature is the ability to do otherwise; at minimum this is true with respect to that initial first choice. Apparently, this is not true for future choices that have been determined by the first.
A few basic features inform a compatiblistic view of the will and choice-making. Human choices are made on account of causal reasons. Hence, as Jonathan Edwards pointed out, "to choose is to prefer." A choice is a selection in keeping with one's highest preference. Often times this is described in other terms of a person choosing what he wants. When a person does what he most wants or preferrs, then he is responsible for the choice. Because choices are inherently caused, the type of causation is extremely important. Some types of causation do remove responsibility while other types of causation do not remove responsibility.
Libertarian freedom, because of its view of human ultimacy, sees any form of ultimate divine causation as removing human accountability.
Compatibilistic freedom, because of its view of human nature, sees a clear difference between transcendent causation and imminent, internal causation. Thusly, human accountability is maintain even though the person could not have done otherwise.
Causal Conflation Fallacy
Because libertarian freedom holds to human ultimacy with respect to at least the initial movement of the will, the advocate will reject any and all forms of causation that might make the will unable to choose otherwise. Unfortunately, this leads the advocate to ignore the important distinctions of the compatibilist. The distinctions between ultimate, proximate, primary, secondary, efficient, internal, external, imminent, and transcendent are all ignored. This leads to the causal conflation fallacy and two people talking past each other. The libertarian advocate deceptively conflates all forms of causation into only "cause." Even if a person, on compatibilist terms, does something that they want to do, and the person is the immediate cause of their sin, the libertarian ignores all of these extremely important distinctions (establishing responsibility upon non-libertarian grounds) and focuses upon God's ultimate causality. This "turning a blind eye" to radically important distinctions of causality is what I am calling the "causal conflation fallacy."
The fact is that the Bible advocates a rather complex, multifaceted system of cause and effect. Take the crucifixion as an example. One of my teachers asked the class, "who caused Jesus' death." Note the word "cause" here. Also note the ambiguity. (1) We can note the language of Is 53 as the Father crushes the Son. (2) We can note that Jesus says that no one takes his life, but he lays it down. (3) We can note the multiple human groups involved in the false condemnation of Jesus. (4) We can note the Roman soldiers as they whipped and nailed Jesus to the tree. (5) We can note our own role in contributing our sin, as our sin was laid upon the spotless lamb of God. In each of these examples a different type of causation is biblically warranted. In the realm of providence, God's sustaining hand is often differentiated from His imminent causation. You also have different persons of the Trinity contributing to different causal roles in the application of salvation. In short, the Bible advocates a rather complex, multifaceted system of cause and effect. The causal conflation fallacy ignores the various types with only the sole focus of maintaining human ultimacy with respect to at least the first move of the will. Do compabilists claim to know all things with respect to responsibility? No, but much of what they say goes ignored by the causal conflation fallacy.
Conclusion
A few concluding thoughts encapsulate this post so far. Ideas have consequences; they lead people to different conclusions (note the causal reality of beliefs upon conclusions, and the conclusions lead to decisions to post). The libertarian view of the will leads its advocate to lie and grossly distort the compatibilistic view. The lying takes place when the accusation is made that the other person is making God responsible for sin. A difference in understanding responsibility, choice-making, and causation ought to be acknowledged. This difference ought to lead to a nuanced understanding of important causal distinctions, but sometimes these distinctions are glossed over leading people to make false accusations. I hope that this post proves helpful to aid people to wade through some difficult discussions. Does this post address every issue? Not by a long shot, but it serves as an elementary springboard.
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