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Greg the atheist on the Importance of Salvation


Then if God has secretly willed that I sin, I should refrain from fulfilling that aspect of God's will. I'll put it into the form of a deductive syllogism, which then means you cannot reasonably disagree with the conclusion unless you prove Premise 1 is factually incorrect, or prove Premise 2 is factually incorrect, or show that the Conclusion fails to properly distribute the middle, since those are the only 3 ways to "refute" such a syllogism. If both premises are factually correct and the conclusion properly distributes the middle, the syllogism is thus both valid and sound, and for that reason alone, the conclusion necessarily mirrors actual reality. There is no such thing as a valid and sound deductive syllogism in which the conclusion is still false. Here we go:
  • P1 - God secretly willed for Hitler to sin
  • P2 - Hitler should not sin
  • C - Hitler should not do what God secretly willed
I don't think you can successfully attack P1 because a) you believe Hitler murdered Jews, and murder is a sin, and b) the premise is rendered necessarily true by WCF sec.3 (God has ordained all things whatsoever). There is no such thing as anybody deviating from God's secret will, therefore, Hitler's sins of murdering Jews cannot be construed as deviating from God's secret will. That logically leaves no other possibility except that Hitler's murder of Jews had conformed to God's secret will. Thus P1 is factually true

I don't think you can successfully attack P2 because W.ShorterCatechism Answer to Q 39 says it is man's duty to obey the "revealed" will of God, which in Hitler's case was the perfect equivalent of "Hitler should not sin". The revealed will of God is the Law, and the Law says "thou shalt not murder". So "Hitler should not sin" is factually true, thus P2 is factually true.

At this point the only hope of refuting the syllogism is to show that the conclusion fails to properly distribute the middle.

I don't think you can argue that the conclusion fails to properly distribute the middle, because "Hitler" and "should not" is found in both second premise and the conclusion, and God's secret will is represented in both first premise and the conclusion. Thus the conclusion is true. Thus the syllogism is both valid and sound. And the conclusion in a valid and sound syllogism is necessarily reality itself, it's not a recommendation or a subjective viewpoint.

Thus the conclusion, "Hitler should not do what God secretly willed" (as defined in the syllogism) is true.

And Christians always give unbelievers the truth :)
 
I'll put it into the form of a deductive syllogism, which then means you cannot reasonably disagree with the conclusion unless you prove that Premise 1 is factually incorrect, that Premise 2 is factually incorrect, or that the Conclusion fails to properly distribute the middle, since those are the only three ways to "refute" such a syllogism.
  • Premise 1: God secretly willed for Hitler to sin.
  • Premise 2: Hitler should not sin.
  • Conclusion: Hitler should not do what God secretly willed.

Well … [chuckle] … my goodness, those are not the only three ways to refute your syllogism.

First of all, “distributing the middle” is language from testing categorical syllogisms, but that is not the form your argument takes. A categorical syllogism has three categorical propositions: major premise, minor premise, and conclusion. Each proposition relates classes or categories using terms like all, no, or some. Its basic anatomy is:
  • Major premise: All M are P.
  • Minor premise: All S are M.
  • Conclusion: Therefore, all S are P.
Here, S is the minor term, P is the major term, and M is the middle term. The middle term appears in both premises but not in the conclusion. That is the kind of syllogism where people talk about distribution of terms, undistributed middle, illicit process, and so on.

Your argument has no middle term to distribute because it’s not a categorical syllogism; that is, you’re not relating three classes through a shared middle term. It is closer to a propositional or maybe predicative inference involving substitution into an intensional context. We don’t have class-inclusion reasoning about sets or categories, here, but rather reasoning about one act under two descriptions: “sin,” and “what God secretly willed.” So the structure is more like this:
  • Let X = Hitler’s sinning.
  • Premise 1: God secretly willed X.
  • Premise 2: Hitler ought not do X.
  • Conclusion: Hitler ought not do what God secretly willed.
Perhaps, then, you can see more clearly what I immediately noticed (which is the second point): The conclusion is essentially a restatement of the second premise; it doesn’t advance the argument, it just redescribes the same act-token under different predicates.

Premise 2 says:
  • “Hitler should not sin.”
Premise 1 adds:
  • “God secretly willed for Hitler to sin.”
Given those two premises, the conclusion
  • “Hitler should not do what God secretly willed”
is not really a new inference so much as a repackaging of Premise 2 in light of Premise 1, substituting “sin” with the description “what God secretly willed” (since Premise 1 identified Hitler’s sin as something God secretly willed).

I agree that Hitler should not disobey God’s commands, and I agree that Hitler disobeying God was included in God’s decree. We see this sort of dynamic all over Scripture (e.g., Sennacherib). So, I fail to see what troubling inference this is supposed to produce.

[This] means you cannot reasonably disagree with the conclusion …

Why would I? It is essentially a restatement of Premise 2 anyway.

I don't think you can argue that the conclusion fails to properly distribute the middle, because "Hitler" and "should not" is found in both second premise and the conclusion, and God's secret will is represented in both first premise and the conclusion.

You are treating repeated words or phrases as though that were enough to generate a middle term. That is adorably naïve.

In a categorical syllogism, the middle term is the term that appears in both premises and not in the conclusion. Its role is to link the minor term (subject of the conclusion) and the major term (predicate of the conclusion), enabling the deductive inference. But in your argument nothing is arranged that way.

I agree that Christians should always give unbelievers the truth—and I have, bluntly yet carefully.
 
4.4. Identify and address only one logical fallacy at a time. To ensure fair and orderly debate, members may identify only one alleged logical fallacy at a time in an opponent's argument. Additional accusations may not be introduced until the initial claim has been acknowledged and refuted or otherwise resolved. This prevents discussions from being overwhelmed by a cascade of accusations which, if addressed, would derail meaningful engagement. Fallacy accusations should be made in good faith, with evidence, careful attention to context, and a willingness to be corrected if mistaken.

Members who have been called out for a logical fallacy are expected to address that specific charge in good faith, either conceding the point or demonstrating that no fallacy occurred by clarifying their reasoning.


------------

I believe you violated that rule with a response to which a rebuttal that is sufficiently comprehensive could easily fill 20 pages.

In an effort to comply with the above-cited rule, I'll deal with your criticism one point at a time, although I'll just point out the obvious: your failure to see what "troubling inference" the conclusion raises, sort of moots the vast bulk of your detailed response. Apparently I didn't have to go to the trouble of attempting to justify the conclusion because you apparently see nothing wrong with the conclusion. You made a key concession that renders everything else you said irrelevant.

The "point" I deal with now is the way you fallaciously sap the conclusion of it's "troubling inference" by employment of the Strawman and Red Herring fallacies. Here is the conclusion for ease of comparison:
  • Conclusion: Hitler should not do what God secretly willed.
I agree that Hitler should not disobey God’s commands,

Strawman: The conclusion doesn't say "Hitler should not disobey God's commands" The conclusion is:
-------------------------------------------"Hitler should not do what God secretly willed."

We see this sort of dynamic all over Scripture (e.g., Sennacherib). So, I fail to see what troubling inference this is supposed to produce.

If it doesn't raise any troubling inference, then if you could have been a Calvinist speaking to Hitler in 1942, the fact that you don't see what troubling inference the conclusion raises, means you'd also have no problem telling HItler anything which you say doesn't raise any troubling inference, for example, you'd be willing to tell him "Hitler should not do what God secretly willed".

Are you still quite sure that you don't see what troubling inference such a moral statement raises?
 
I believe you violated [rule 4.4] …

Weird, but okay. However, I didn’t allege that you committed even one fallacy, much less more than one, so I clearly did not violate that rule. And when I do allege a fallacy, I do so “in good faith, with evidence, careful attention to context, and a willingness to be corrected if mistaken.”

In an effort to comply with the above-cited rule, I'll deal with your criticism one point at a time, … The "point" I deal with now is the way you fallaciously sap the conclusion of it's "troubling inference" by employment of the Strawman and Red Herring fallacies.

Well, your effort to comply didn’t last even that single post, for you alleged two fallacies. Please be more careful.

The conclusion doesn't say, "Hitler should not disobey God's commands."

Yes, it does. Let’s unpack this for the reader, and you can identify which step, if any, departs from what you’re saying.

(1) Conclusion: “Hitler should not do what God secretly willed.”

(a) What should Hitler not do? Sin. ← Premise 2.
(b) What is sin? Disobedience to what God commands. ← Relevant definition.
(c) What did God secretly will? That Hitler sin. ← Premise 1 (see step 1.b.).
(2) So the conclusion reads:

(a) “Hitler should not do” → sin → “what God secretly willed” [him to do] → sin.
(b) Ergo: “Hitler should not sin.”
(c) Ergo: “Hitler should not disobey God’s commands.”
If this is genuinely a strawman caricature, you should be able to identify the exact step where the distortion occurs.

If it doesn't raise any troubling inference, then if you could have been a Calvinist speaking to Hitler in 1942, the fact that you don't see what troubling inference the conclusion raises, means you'd also have no problem telling HItler anything which you say doesn't raise any troubling inference, for example, you'd be willing to tell him "Hitler should not do what God secretly willed."

As best I can reconstruct your point, you seem to be saying this:

If that conclusion raises no troubling inference for you, then suppose you had been a Calvinist speaking to Hitler in 1942. In that case, since you see nothing problematic in the conclusion, you would presumably have no hesitation in telling Hitler, “You should not do what God secretly willed.”

If that is your point, then yes, that is correct. I would have no hesitation in telling Hitler that he should not do what God secretly willed him to do (i.e., he should not disobey God’s commands).

But notice the shift. The original question was whether the proposition is internally contradictory. (It is not.) You now seem to have shifted to a different question, namely, “Would you say this sentence to Hitler’s face?” But those are not the same issue. However, even on your revised question, the answer is still yes.

Are you still quite sure that you don't see what troubling inference such a moral statement raises?

Yes, I am quite sure. There is no “troubling” inference.

Apparently I didn't have to go to the trouble of attempting to justify the conclusion because you apparently see nothing wrong with the conclusion.

Naturally, for there is simply nothing troubling there. It is true that God secretly willed Hitler to sin. It is also true that Hitler is morally obligated to not sin. Your attempted reductio has merely restated standard Calvinist theology, which is not troubling to a Calvinist. It becomes troubling only if one confuses God’s secret will (decree) with his revealed will (commands).

You made a key concession that renders everything else you said irrelevant.

No, mate, everything else I said remains relevant. For example, since you described your argument as a categorical syllogism with a properly distributed middle, it remains entirely relevant to point out that your argument has no middle term to distribute, because it is not a categorical syllogism.

It also remains relevant that your conclusion is not really a new inference so much as a repackaging of Premise 2 in light of Premise 1. It simply substitutes “sin” with the description “what God secretly willed,” so the conclusion is basically just Premise 2 in different words. That is the sort of sleight of hand a casual reader might miss but should not, therefore drawing attention to it remains entirely relevant.
 
Weird, but okay. However, I didn’t allege that you committed even one fallacy, much less more than one, so I clearly did not violate that rule. And when I do allege a fallacy, I do so “in good faith, with evidence, careful attention to context, and a willingness to be corrected if mistaken.”



Well, your effort to comply didn’t last even that single post, for you alleged two fallacies. Please be more careful.



Yes, it does. Let’s unpack this for the reader, and you can identify which step, if any, departs from what you’re saying.
(1) Conclusion: “Hitler should not do what God secretly willed.”​
(a) What should Hitler not do? Sin. ← Premise 2.​

(b) What is sin? Disobedience to what God commands. ← Relevant definition.​

(c) What did God secretly will? That Hitler sin. ← Premise 1 (see step 1.b.).​

(2) So the conclusion reads:​
(a) “Hitler should not do” → sin → “what God secretly willed” [him to do] → sin.​

(b) Ergo: “Hitler should not sin.”​

(c) Ergo: “Hitler should not disobey God’s commands.”

If this is genuinely a strawman caricature, you should be able to identify the exact step where the distortion occurs.



As best I can reconstruct your point, you seem to be saying this:

If that conclusion raises no troubling inference for you, then suppose you had been a Calvinist speaking to Hitler in 1942. In that case, since you see nothing problematic in the conclusion, you would presumably have no hesitation in telling Hitler, “You should not do what God secretly willed.”

If that is your point, then yes, that is correct. I would have no hesitation in telling Hitler that he should not do what God secretly willed him to do (i.e., he should not disobey God’s commands).

But notice the shift. The original question was whether the proposition is internally contradictory. (It is not.) You now seem to have shifted to a different question, namely, “Would you say this sentence to Hitler’s face?” But those are not the same issue. However, even on your revised question, the answer is still yes.



Yes, I am quite sure. There is no “troubling” inference.



Naturally, for there is simply nothing troubling there. It is true that God secretly willed Hitler to sin. It is also true that Hitler is morally obligated to not sin. Your attempted reductio has merely restated standard Calvinist theology, which is not troubling to a Calvinist. It becomes troubling only if one confuses God’s secret will (decree) with his revealed will (commands).



No, mate, everything else I said remains relevant. For example, since you described your argument as a categorical syllogism with a properly distributed middle, it remains entirely relevant to point out that your argument has no middle term to distribute, because it is not a categorical syllogism.

It also remains relevant that your conclusion is not really a new inference so much as a repackaging of Premise 2 in light of Premise 1. It simply substitutes “sin” with the description “what God secretly willed,” so the conclusion is basically just Premise 2 in different words. That is the sort of sleight of hand a casual reader might miss but should not, therefore drawing attention to it remains entirely relevant.

Please delete the "GREG" account, Joined Monday at 6:06 PM

I have no intention of continuing such unconscionably stupid trifles with fools who reserve the right to arbitrarily decide what portions of my posted arguments should remain and which should be altered by something else or removed. And I further accuse the same fools of unfairly selective enforcement of the rules. Certain members treated me [with contempt] and nothing was done. I haven't treated anybody with anywhere near such contempt, and yet this Atheist at a Calvinist forum has his posts routinely edited or removed by idiot moderators whose purpose is not discovery of scholarly error, but doing whatever they can possibly think of to make Calvinists feel better about remaining Calvinist. I'm not going to cast my pearls before you swine, and I shake the dust from my feet.
 
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Should I refrain from sinning, yes or no?


Just out of curiosity, WHY? Why should a "sinner" refrain from "sinning"?
  • He has no hope of obtaining "righteousness" by not sinning.
  • He is "condemned already" (John 3:18) for his unbelief.
  • He exists in the dead state described in Ephesians 2 ... "who were dead in trespasses and sins, in which you once walked according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit who now works in the sons of disobedience, among whom also we all once conducted ourselves in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, just as the others." ... without the "But God" of verse 4.
So, what difference will it make?
To channel my inner Taylor Swift: "Sinner gonna sin, sin, sin, sin ..." ;)
 
Just out of curiosity, WHY? Why should a "sinner" refrain from "sinning"?
Because both the temporal and eternal consequences of sin are adverse.
So what difference will it make?
Those bullet points are only salient for the elect. The effects of sin, on the other hand, are universal.
To channel my inner Taylor Swift: "Sinner gonna sin, sin, sin, sin ..." ;)
Yep.

That does not mean one sinner cannot live better than another sinner, even if that life is measured by the sinner's metrics. I have degrees in sociology, anthropology and social psychology (and other fields of study). No matter how far back the scientists go and no matter what theoretical or philosophical bias they may or may not possess three absolutes prove true (secularists hate calling them "absolutes" so they call the "universals").

  • Humans are moral
  • Humans are social.
  • Humans are spiritual.

There are no amoral cultures. No matter where we look, no matter how far we go back, all cultures codify conduct (and tend to codify it along common metrics). The same holds true for the other two conditions. There are no hermit cultures and as far back as we go, no matter where we look, we find humans religiously ritualizing something spiritually (even if it is a tree or a rock).

A person (sinner or not) cannot jump off a cliff and avoid the consequences of the sudden stop at the end of the fall. The same holds true for all the other laws of creation...... including the laws governing the human soul/spirit.

Sin kills.

And it does not ask anyone's permission to do so.

Ecclesiastes 8:15
And I commend joy, for man has nothing better under the sun but to eat and drink and be joyful, for this will go with him in his toil through the days of his life that God has given him under the sun.

There is a way which seems right to a man, but its end is the way of death.

Visit prison sometime and spend what time you can with a serial rapist or murderer. Then come ask me the question again.
 
Just out of curiosity: Why should a "sinner" refrain from "sinning"?

Because the sinner’s duty is not first explained by what may benefit him, but by whose he is. His obligation to not sin arises from God’s absolute right over his creatures. “Behold, all souls are mine.” God made man for himself, defines the good, commands righteousness, and therefore man owes obedience simply because God is God and man is his creature.

Yes, he is condemned already. But that doesn’t relieve him of the obligation. When a criminal is convicted and sentenced, he is not suddenly free to violate the law. He remains bound to obey the law, even in prison (under condemnation).

And true, he has no hope of obtaining righteousness by refraining from sin—but that is true for everyone, including the saints. The sinner is not morally obligated to avoid sin because obedience accrues to his benefit in some way or other. He is obligated because he is not his own. He was made by God, belongs to God, and exists for God.
 
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